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United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific

Report of the Secretary-General

Summary

The present report provides an overview of the activities undertaken by the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific during the period from 1 July 2015 to 30 June 2016.

During the reporting period, the Regional Centre continued to promote dialogue and confidence-building in the region and beyond by organizing conferences on disarmament and non-proliferation issues. The fourteenth United Nations-Republic of Korea Joint Conference on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Issues, held in Seoul in December 2015, addressed global and regional nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament challenges, outer space security and nuclear security in the context of the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit. The twenty-fifth United Nations Conference on Disarmament Issues, held in Hiroshima, Japan, in August 2015, addressed the outcome of the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; the role of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty for achieving nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation; humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons; and the role of civil society and disarmament education in efforts towards a nuclear-weapon-free world.

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The Centre promoted the universalization and implementation of multilateral arms control and non-proliferation instruments through technical assistance and capacity-building programmes provided to Member States upon their request. The programmes included a focus on the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, the Arms Trade Treaty and Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), and were implemented through the organization of subregional and national workshops. In accordance with General Assembly resolution 70/65, the Centre has, in coordination with its host country, Nepal, started preparations for the resumption of its operations from Kathmandu, following its temporary relocation to Bangkok after strong earthquakes in April and May 2015.

The Regional Centre depends solely upon voluntary financial contributions to implement its programmatic activities. The Secretary-General wishes to express his gratitude to Member States, in particular the host country, Nepal, and other partners that have provided support for the Centre's operations and programmes with financial and in-kind assistance. He also wishes to thank Thailand for its support for the temporary operation of the Centre in Bangkok. The Secretary-General calls upon countries in the region and beyond to make voluntary contributions to the Centre to ensure the sustainability of its activities and operations and to enable it to fulfil the mandate entrusted to it by the General Assembly.

I. Introduction

1. Pursuant to General Assembly resolution 42/39 D, the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific is mandated to provide, upon request, substantive support for initiatives and other activities mutually agreed upon by Member States in Asia and the Pacific for the implementation of measures for peace and disarmament through the appropriate utilization of available resources. The Regional Centre facilitates and coordinates the implementation of regional activities of the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs in Asia and the Pacific.

2. In its resolution 70/65, the General Assembly expressed its satisfaction at the activities carried out in the past year by the Regional Centre and reaffirmed its strong support for the role of the Centre in the promotion of activities of the United Nations at the regional level to strengthen peace, stability and security among the Member States in Asia and the Pacific. It also expressed its gratitude to the Government of the host country, Nepal, for its cooperation and financial support. The Assembly requested the Secretary-General to report to the Assembly at its seventy-first session on the implementation of the resolution.

3. The present report is submitted in compliance with the above-mentioned request and covers the activities of the Regional Centre during the period from 1 July 2015 to 30 June 2016. A financial statement on the status of the Trust Fund for the Regional Centre for the second year of the biennium 2014-2015 is contained in the annex to the present report.

II. Activities of the Regional Centre

4. During the reporting period, the Regional Centre focused its programmatic activities on the following areas: promoting the implementation of global disarmament and non-proliferation instruments, including by providing assistance to Member States in the region, upon their request, in national capacity-building; enhancing dialogue and confidence-building in the areas of disarmament, non-proliferation and regional security; and taking outreach and advocacy initiatives.

A. Promoting the implementation of global disarmament and non-proliferation instruments

5. The Regional Centre organized a South-East Asia regional capacity-building workshop in Bangkok on 4 and 5 April 2016 to foster dialogue towards enhancing national capacity to meet the requirements of the Arms Trade Treaty. The event, hosted by the Government of Thailand, brought together representatives from eight Member States to discuss issues related to national control systems for conventional arms transfers, as well as the Arms Trade Treaty requirements on reporting. Participants exchanged experiences in the preparation for ratification of the Treaty and identified potential opportunities for future assistance and cooperation. The workshop was funded by the United Nations Trust Facility Supporting Cooperation on Arms Regulation. A side event on the implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) supplemented the workshop.

6. The Regional Centre, at the request of Maldives, provided technical and legal assistance to facilitate the implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, and to help build capacity towards accession to the Arms Trade Treaty in August and September 2015. Under this assistance project, international legal and technical experts, together with representatives of the Centre, held consultations with Maldivian national authorities to identify areas for assistance. The experts subsequently submitted practical recommendations for the development of national laws and measures, as well as technical guidelines on developing regulations necessary for the effective control of small arms and light weapons in accordance with the Programme of Action, and for the implementation of the Arms Trade Treaty, with a particular focus on maritime aspects. The project was funded by the United Nations Trust Facility Supporting Cooperation on Arms Regulation.

7. In cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia, the Regional Centre organized a national inter-agency round table to familiarize government officials with the main provisions of and the requirements for joining the Arms Trade Treaty. International experts and representatives of the Office for Disarmament Affairs shared their knowledge and expertise with the 32 representatives from various government agencies, the army, police and the defence industry in attendance. The workshop provided a forum for discussion among international experts and national representatives regarding the national security and defence policy interests that would be served by joining the Treaty, and the ways in which national legislation could be adapted for implementing the Treaty's provisions. The project was funded by the Government of Germany.

8. In response to a request by the Philippines, contained in its national report on the Programme of Action, the Regional Centre organized a two-day national capacity-building workshop on the control of small arms and light weapons, in cooperation with the Office of the Special Envoy on Transnational Crime of the Philippines, in Manila in November 2015. Participation included over 40 officials from the Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs, and the National Police. The workshop addressed legal and technical issues related to small arms control, including the national status of the implementation of the Programme of Action and assistance needs; existing small arms control provisions contained in global instruments and national implementation, including through the national action plan; and physical security and stockpile management issues. The project was funded by the Government of Germany.

9. In cooperation with the Government of Myanmar, the Regional Centre organized a two-day national capacity-building workshop on the control of small arms and light weapons and ammunition, in Nay Pyi Taw, Myanmar, in February 2016. The event brought together more than 40 government officials and experts from relevant ministries and agencies, as well as international and United Nations experts, to discuss major international agreements, in particular the Programme of Action. The workshop focused on concrete measures to strengthen control of such weapons, including a national coordinating mechanism and a national action plan. The workshop was funded by the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

10. The Regional Centre, in cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Thailand, held a two-day capacity-building national workshop on the Programme of

Action and the Arms Trade Treaty in Bangkok in March 2016. The workshop aimed to provide assistance in enhancing national capacity to implement the Programme of Action and to meet the import, export and transfer standards of conventional arms under the Treaty. The workshop also included discussions on practical issues of reporting to the relevant international instruments. The project was funded by the Government of Germany.

B. Promoting dialogue and confidence in the areas of disarmament, non-proliferation and security

11. The Regional Centre organized two annual international conferences on disarmament, non-proliferation and security issues, in collaboration with the Governments of Japan and the Republic of Korea. The conferences served as important forums for engaging Member States, intergovernmental organizations, academia, civil society and other stakeholders in frank discussions on major challenges in the areas of disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control, as well as regional security, contributing to confidence-building and to efforts to seek solutions to complex issues in these areas.

12. In cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan and with support provided by the prefecture and city of Hiroshima, the Regional Centre organized the twenty-fifth United Nations Conference on Disarmament Issues, "Towards the Realization of a World Free of Nuclear Weapons following the 2015 NPT Review Conference", held in Hiroshima in August 2015. More than 80 participants took part in the Conference, which addressed ways towards achieving a world free of nuclear weapons and the role of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in promoting nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, with the participation of members of the Group of Eminent Persons of the Treaty. Participants also discussed the outcome of the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the future review cycle; the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons; nuclear-weapon-free zones and transparency and confidence-building measures; as well as the role of civil society and public disarmament education. In addition, a special session was held with high school and university students who presented their perspectives and discussed peace and disarmament issues with Conference participants, highlighting the significance of peace and disarmament education and public support.

13. In cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea, the Regional Centre organized the fourteenth United Nations-Republic of Korea Joint Conference on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Issues on the theme "Unfinished Business of Building a More Secure World", in Seoul on 7 and 8 December 2015. More than 120 representatives from Governments, intergovernmental organizations, policy institutes, academia and civil society organizations participated in the Conference, which addressed outer space security in the context of ongoing deliberations regarding ensuring the sustainable and secure exploration of and use of outer space, including an international code of conduct. Participants had an in-depth exchange of views on the issue of nuclear security in relation to the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit and the strengthening of the nuclear security architecture. Regional issues were also discussed, including the implications of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action with the Islamic Republic

of Iran. In addition, the Conference discussed the relevance of the Iranian negotiation process to reviving the Six-Party Talks on the Korean nuclear issues.

C. Partnership, outreach and advocacy

14. The Regional Centre continued its efforts to strengthen partnerships with major stakeholders in the region, including Member States, subregional organizations, other United Nations entities and civil society, through its concerted communications and outreach activities and through joint initiatives and collaborative projects. In this context, the Centre established contact with the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation and enhanced its partnerships with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the European Union, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation and the Pacific Islands Forum through, inter alia, information exchange and mutual invitations to events organized by the Centre and these organizations.

15. The Regional Centre contributed substantively to the United Nations Institute for Training and Research Hiroshima Training Programme on Nuclear Disarmament for South-East Asia for young diplomats from Asian States in May and June 2016. The Programme enriched participants' knowledge of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation issues, and provided an opportunity for them to improve their negotiation skills.

16. The Regional Centre participated in a regional workshop organized by the Parliamentarians for Global Action on armed violence and the regulation of small arms and light weapons, held in Dhakain August 2015, and made a presentation on the Centre's activities regarding the Programme of Action and the Arms Trade Treaty.

17. The Regional Centre contributed to a national round table on the implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), held in Nay Pyi Taw, Myanmar, in January 2016. The event focused on Myanmar's efforts in implementing the resolution to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to non-State actors and possible assistance needed to strengthen the implementation of the resolution.

18. The Regional Centre continued its efforts to ensure the regular provision of accurate and timely information about its work and about disarmament issues in general, in particular through its website, the publication of fact sheets and newsletters, and through social media.

D. Future activities

19. The Regional Centre plans to expand the scope of its work programme to provide practical assistance to Member States in the region, at their request, especially in the areas of training, technical assistance and capacity-building, in order to contribute to national and regional disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control implementation efforts, as well as peace and disarmament education.

III. Staffing and financing

20. Three posts of the Regional Centre are funded from the regular budget: the Director (P-5), one Professional (P-3) and one General Service (Local level) staff member. The host country, Nepal, through its voluntary contribution, funded two local staff. In addition, Switzerland provided the Centre with one United Nations Youth Volunteer and one Junior Professional Officer. Japan provided the Centre with one United Nations Volunteer.

21. The Regional Centre relies on voluntary contributions for all of its substantive programmes and for a portion of its operating costs. The Secretary-General encourages other Member States to consider providing financial and in-kind contributions to the Centre.

22. In 2015, voluntary contributions in the total amount of $333,406 were received from Member States. The Secretary-General wishes to express his gratitude to the Member States that made financial and in-kind contributions to the Regional Centre, including Canada, China, Germany, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Switzerland, Thailand and the United Kingdom. Such financial and in-kind contributions remain essential to ensuring the sustainability of the operations, core activities and programmes of the Centre. The Secretary-General urges all Member States, in particular those from the region, as well as other donors, to provide financial resources in support of the Centre's programmes, which benefit Asia and the Pacific.

IV. Conclusion

23. During the reporting period, the Regional Centre engaged in and provided support for disarmament initiatives in Asia and the Pacific. Working in partnership with Member States and other stakeholders, it continued to fulfil its mandate to provide assistance, upon request, to Member States and to carry out outreach and advocacy activities. The annual conferences held in Japan and the Republic of Korea continue to provide important forums for promoting dialogue and confidence-building in the areas of disarmament, non-proliferation and regional security. The Centre stands ready to expand its technical assistance to Member States in addressing the challenges they face in the fields of disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control as part of the efforts of the United Nations to promote peace, security and disarmament in the region and the world.

Annex

Status of the Trust Fund for the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific for 2015

(United States dollars)

Reserves and fund balance, 1 January 2015	**785 964**
Prior-year adjustment	31 978[a]
Accumulated surplus/deficit	817 942
Revenue	
Voluntary contributions	315 984[b]
Investment revenue	4 146
Other exchange revenue	(12 127)
Total revenue	**308 003**
Expenses	
Operating expenses	179 107
Depreciation and amortization	843
Total expenses	**179 950**
Surplus/deficit	128 053
Accumulated surplus	**945 955**[c]

[a] Consists of the 2015 net contribution of $22,725 from Switzerland.

[b] Consists of the accumulated surplus received from donors, less refunds, in accordance with IPSAS reporting standards: Canada, $15,572; China, $50,000; Germany, $105,659; Japan, $102,818; Republic of Korea, $43,900; Thailand, $3,000; United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, $12,457; DEZA (Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation) (refund), ($17,422).

[c] Consists of the accumulated surplus as at 1 January 2015 plus revenue received, less expenses during the year.

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General and complete disarmament

Nuclear disarmament; follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons; reducing nuclear danger

Report of the Secretary-General

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I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to requests contained in General Assembly resolutions 70/52, 70/56 and 70/37.

2. In paragraph 3 of resolution 70/56, the General Assembly requested all States to inform the Secretary-General of the efforts and measures they had taken with respect to the implementation of the resolution and nuclear disarmament and requested the Secretary-General to apprise the General Assembly of that information at its seventy-first session.

3. In paragraph 22 of resolution 70/52, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its seventy-first session a report on the implementation of the resolution.

4. In paragraph 5 of resolution 70/37, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to intensify efforts and support initiatives that would contribute towards the full implementation of the seven recommendations identified in the report of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters that would significantly reduce the risk of nuclear war,[1] and also to continue to encourage Member States to consider the convening of an international conference, as proposed in the United Nations Millennium Declaration,[2] to identify ways of eliminating nuclear dangers, and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its seventy-first session.

II. Observations

5. Since the previous report (A/70/181), States have undertaken various efforts to facilitate the implementation of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation agreements.

(a) On 29 September 2015, in New York, at the ninth Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (Article XIV Conference), ministers for foreign affairs and other high-level representatives of States adopted a Final Declaration and Measures to Promote the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. In the declaration, they reaffirmed the vital importance and urgency of the entry into force of the Treaty and recalled the deep concern expressed in the outcome document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons with respect to the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons. Moreover, they noted that 2015 was the seventieth anniversary of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and also encouraged all States to actively participate in the annual International Day against Nuclear Tests established by the General Assembly in resolution 64/35. The Article XIV Conference was chaired by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Japan, Fumio Kishida, and of Kazakhstan, Erlan Idrissov. Participating States underscored the importance of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty as a critical component of the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime, and encouraged universal adherence to the Treaty in 2016, the 20th anniversary of its opening for signature. While none of the Annex II States have ratified the Treaty since the Secretary-General's previous

[1] A/56/400, para. 3.
[2] Resolution 55/2.

report, on 20 March 2016, Angola ratified the Treaty, becoming the 164th State to do so.

(b) The 2016 session of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, the second session of its three-year cycle, was held from 4 to 22 April 2016 in New York, chaired by Odo Tevi (Vanuatu). At the session, procedural reports of the Commission and its subsidiary bodies were adopted. The report of the Commission for 2016 (A/71/42) reflects the informal discussions held on the possible inclusion on the agenda of a third item and the Chair's intention to continue informal consultations in that regard. During its 12 meetings, Working Group I on agenda item 4 ("Recommendations for achieving the objective of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons") discussed the Chair's 2015 non-paper, the Chair's non-paper of 11 April 2016 and the Chair's revised non-paper of 17 April 2016. The Chair's revised non-paper of 17 April, presented by Kairat Abdrakhmanov (Kazakhstan), sought to consolidate the previous papers by addressing objectives, principles and recommendations for achieving the objective of nuclear disarmament and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Although the Working Group held in-depth discussions, Member States were unable to reach consensus on substantive recommendations because there remained a divergence of views. Nonetheless, discussions on agenda item 4 will continue at the substantive session in 2017, when the current cycle of sessions will be completed.

(c) The two nuclear-weapon States with the largest arsenals took steps to implement the reductions agreed to in the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. The Treaty's central limits on strategic arms are to be met by 6 February 2018. As at 1 March 2016, according to the data provided by the parties on their aggregate holdings of strategic offensive arms, the Russian Federation possessed 521 deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles and heavy bombers and 1,735 warheads on those systems, and the United States of America possessed 741 deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles and heavy bombers and 1,481 warheads on those systems. Moreover, the United States reiterated its willingness to negotiate further reductions of deployed strategic nuclear weapons by up to one third below the level set by the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, as initially proposed by the President of the United States, Barack Obama, during a speech in Berlin in June 2013.

6. In addition to the efforts discussed above, other multilateral initiatives have been pursued that could contribute to the achievement of a world without nuclear weapons:

(a) An informal meeting of the United Nations General Assembly to mark the 2015 observance of the International Day against Nuclear Tests was held on 10 September 2015 at United Nations Headquarters. Opening statements were made by the President of the sixty-ninth session of the General Assembly, Sam Kutesa (Uganda), as well as by the Secretary-General and the Permanent Representative of the Republic of Kazakhstan to the United Nations. Following the opening ceremony, a High-level Interactive Panel on the theme "Towards zero: resolving the contradictions" exchanged views on how common ground might be reached among different approaches to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons.

(b) On 14 July 2015, the E3/EU+3 (China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America) and the Islamic Republic of Iran announced that they had

reached agreement on a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. That agreement was the culmination of more than a decade of negotiations aimed at achieving a peaceful and diplomatic solution that would restore international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of the nuclear programme of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The key nuclear-related commitments under the Plan of Action are: a reduction in the number of installed and operating centrifuges in the Islamic Republic of Iran for 10 years; limitation on the enrichment level of low-enriched uranium for 15 years; the conversion of the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant to non-enrichment-related research and activities; the redesign and conversion of the heavy water research reactor at Arak to be less capable of producing plutonium; the provisional application of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Additional Protocol pending its entry into force; and acceptance of monitoring and verification at uranium mines and milling sites as well as at uranium centrifuge production and storage facilities.

(c) Building on the momentum garnered from the constructive engagement at the first-ever high-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament, in 2013, the member States of the Non-Aligned Movement sought to take forward that initiative through the introduction in the First Committee of a draft resolution, entitled "Follow-up to the 2013 high-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament", which was subsequently adopted by the Assembly (resolution 70/34). Pursuant to the declaration of 26 September as the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons by the General Assembly in resolution 68/32, the 2015 meeting to commemorate that day was held on 30 September 2015. It was chaired by the President of the seventieth session of the General Assembly, Mogens Lykketoft (Denmark). The Secretary-General marked the occasion with a message in which he reiterated the view that the only absolute guarantee that nuclear weapons were never used again was their total elimination.[3] As was the case in 2015, civil society also made an important contribution to the commemoration and promotion of the International Day. Statements were delivered by representatives of the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons and of the Marshallese Educational Initiative.

(d) In resolution 70/33, the General Assembly decided to convene an open-ended working group with a mandate to substantively address concrete effective legal measures, legal provisions and norms that would needed to be concluded to attain and maintain a world without nuclear weapons. The first and second substantive sessions of the working group, chaired by Thani Thongphakdi (Thailand), were convened in Geneva in February and May 2016, respectively, with broad participation by Member States, civil society and international organizations. Various working papers were submitted by States and by non-governmental organizations. Following the first substantive session, the Chair submitted a synthesis paper reflecting the main points of discussion. During the second substantive session, further discussions were held on a range of elements considered important for the achievement and maintenance of a nuclear weapon-free world, such as measures to reduce and eliminate the risk of accidental, mistaken, unauthorized or intentional nuclear weapon detonations, and transparency measures relating to the risks associated with existing nuclear weapons. Participating States also addressed additional measures to increase awareness and understanding of the

[3] www.un.org/en/events/nuclearweaponelimination/2015/sgmessage.shtml.

complexity of and the interrelationship between the humanitarian consequences that would result from any nuclear detonation. States also reflected on essential elements that could form part of effective legal measures, legal provisions and norms that would need to be concluded to attain and maintain a world without nuclear weapons.

(e) In the context of the Nuclear Security Summit process initiated by the President of the United States, Barack Obama, in 2009, participating States engaged with the United Nations and other key multilateral institutions that have a stake in building an enduring global nuclear security architecture, in particular IAEA and INTERPOL. States have taken steps to secure vulnerable nuclear material worldwide. At the final Nuclear Security Summit in the current framework, held in Washington, D.C. on 31 March and 1 April 2016, and building upon the work carried out at the previous summits in 2010, 2012 and 2014, participating States adopted a communiqué as well as five distinct action plans for respective stakeholders, namely, the United Nations, IAEA, INTERPOL, the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism.[4] Representatives of 52 States attended, along with those of three international organizations and the European Union. The communiqué, in particular, outlines measures that will maintain the momentum generated by the Nuclear Security Summit process, while strengthening nuclear security at the national, regional and global levels. The United Nations Action Plan focuses on the implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) and universalization of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism as instruments that form the legal basis for combating nuclear terrorism. Also in the framework of the Nuclear Security Summit, States have prioritized the strengthening of national implementation of nuclear security through tangible commitments from countries in the form of house gifts and gift baskets.

(f) Pursuant to General Assembly resolution 65/66, the first substantive session of an open-ended working group to consider the objectives and agenda, including the possible establishment of a preparatory committee, for a fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament was convened from 28 March to 1 April 2016 for a total of eight meetings. State representatives discussed in an interactive manner a range of substantive issues of relevance to the possible objectives and agenda of a fourth special session. A briefing on the outcomes of the previous Special Sessions of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament was also provided to delegates and was followed by a robust exchange of questions and answers. The Chair of the open-ended working group, Fernando Luque (Ecuador), indicated his intention of circulating a proposal for objectives and an agenda based on the inputs of States, ahead of the second substantive session in July 2016.

(g) Although the Conference on Disarmament continued to face challenges, efforts were exerted by the Presidents of the 2015 session, as well as the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament, to reinvigorate multilateral disarmament discussions, albeit in a non-negotiating format. The six Presidents organized a range of informal meetings during their tenures in order to address the four core agenda items, namely, nuclear disarmament, a fissile material treaty,

[4] www.nss2016.org/2016-action-plans/.

prevention of an arms race in outer space and negative security assurances. The six Presidents of the 2015 session also continued consultations on a possible programme of work. Although consensus on a programme of work remained elusive, the members did engage in a range of discussions contributing to further understanding of national views. The Conference also established an informal working group on a programme of work. Established by decision CD/2022 in June 2015, the Informal Working Group provided a venue for a series of consultations, over a relatively short period, with a view to garnering support for a programme of work.

7. Despite some progress in implementing nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation agreements and pursuing new initiatives to support those goals, setbacks and growing impatience with the slow pace of progress have persisted.

(a) Advancement towards the implementation of the 1995 resolution on a zone free of nuclear and all other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East has been challenging. Despite the efforts of the appointed facilitator, Jaako Laajava (Finland), and the co-conveners of the proposed conference,[5] a sixth round of informal consultations was not held before the 2015 Review Conference. Deep disappointment over the continued postponement of the conference since 2012 remained widespread and the lack of agreement at the 2015 Review Conference has left the process in a state of uncertainty.

(b) The protracted stalemate in the multilateral disarmament machinery, namely the United Nations Disarmament Commission and the Conference on Disarmament, poses a formidable challenge to the achievement of nuclear disarmament. The inability to make substantive progress in those forums continues to present an obstacle to nuclear disarmament. Additionally, the longstanding deadlock has further encouraged some States to consider actions to make progress outside of the machinery.

(c) While efforts towards reducing existing stockpiles are acknowledged, the estimated total number of nuclear weapons, deployed and non-deployed, still amounts to several thousands. Moreover, States continue to rely on nuclear weapons in defence and security policies, and undertake programmes to modernize their weapons, delivery systems and related infrastructure.

(d) On 6 January 2016, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea conducted its fourth nuclear test, despite the strong and unequivocal call from the international community to refrain from any further provocative measures, and contrary to the relevant decisions of the Security Council.

8. While States continue to seek means of intensifying efforts for the achievement of the objective of nuclear disarmament, divisions among States concerning the pathway forward remain deep. Such divisions were a key factor in the inability to reach a substantive outcome agreement at the 2015 Review Conference. Nonetheless, momentum has been generated over the past several years by the humanitarian movement for nuclear disarmament, which has resulted in the General Assembly taking new steps for the elaboration of effective legal measures for nuclear disarmament.

[5] China, the Russian Federation, the United States of America and the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

9. The Secretary-General and the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs continue their efforts to promote nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

III. Information received from Governments

Colombia

[Original: Spanish
18 April 2016]

Colombia has always fully supported the legal instruments and international institutions, and is strongly committed to the disarmament and non-proliferation regime as principles of its foreign policy.

Colombia shares the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control. In this regard, it participates in the major multilateral forums addressing this topic, namely, the Conference on Disarmament, the Disarmament Commission and the open-ended working group to develop proposals to take forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations.

As a State party to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, which established the first densely populated nuclear-weapon-free zone, Colombia advocates the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones as a contribution to international peace and security.

Lastly, Colombia has traditionally voted in favour of the resolution on the issue which is submitted in the General Assembly.

Cuba

[Original: Spanish
31 May 2016]

It is regrettable that, 20 years after the International Court of Justice declared the use of nuclear weapons illegal in its advisory opinion of 8 July 1996 on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons, very little progress has been made towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons and that nuclear deterrence continues to be a core part of the military defence and security doctrines of some States.

Despite the fact that every year the General Assembly adopts a resolution on "Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons", this advisory opinion continues not to be implemented. In this context, Cuba reiterates the importance of the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.

The use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is a violation of the Charter of the United Nations and a violation of both international law and international humanitarian law, constituting a crime against humanity. We are convinced that

prohibition and total elimination is the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

As long as nuclear weapons exist, there is a danger that they might be used. In that regard, the deployment of nuclear weapons by nuclear-weapon States in the territory of non-nuclear-weapon States is a concern, since, in practice, this means there are many more "possessor States".

We strongly condemn the enhancement of existing nuclear weapons and the development of new types of nuclear weapons, which is inconsistent with the obligation to adopt effective measures towards nuclear disarmament. Pursuant to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, nuclear-weapon States have an obligation not only to pursue, but also to bring to a conclusion, negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament under a strict and effective international verification system.

Cuba shares the determination of the international community to achieve the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons through their prohibition and total elimination.

India

[Original: English
31 May 2016]

India joined the co-sponsors of resolution 70/56.

India's consistent support and co-sponsorship of the International Court of Justice resolution in the General Assembly is an expression of its commitment, as underlined by the 1996 Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice, to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control. India's support for the existence of an obligation to pursue in good faith and to conclude nuclear disarmament negotiations is not based on the provisions of any particular legal instrument but is a logical extension of India's consistent political support for nuclear disarmament.

India is convinced that the goal of nuclear disarmament can be achieved by a step-by-step process underwritten by a universal commitment and an agreed multilateral framework that is global and non-discriminatory. There is need for a meaningful dialogue among all States possessing nuclear weapons to build trust and confidence and to reduce the salience of nuclear weapons in international affairs and security doctrines.

India's working paper CD/1816 enumerated specific steps, including reaffirmation of the unequivocal commitment of all nuclear-weapon States to the goal of complete elimination of nuclear weapons; reduction of the salience of nuclear weapons in security doctrines; measures by nuclear-weapon States to reduce nuclear danger; negotiation of a global agreement among nuclear-weapon States on "no first use" of nuclear weapons; negotiation of a universal and legally-binding agreement on non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States; negotiation of a convention on the complete prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; and negotiation of a nuclear weapons convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons and on their

destruction, leading to the global, non-discriminatory and verifiable elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified time frame.

India considers the Conference on Disarmament the appropriate forum for the commencement of negotiations on nuclear disarmament, through the establishment of a subsidiary body with a mandate agreed by consensus as part of a comprehensive and balanced programme of work. India has consistently supported the negotiation in the Conference on Disarmament of a comprehensive nuclear weapons convention, and has also reiterated its readiness to negotiate a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, most recently in the Conference plenary on 26 January 2016.

Islamic Republic of Iran

[Original: English
16 June 2016]

The death and destruction caused by the horrible nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 proved that nuclear weapons, as the most horrendous weapons, are unique in their destructive power, in the unspeakable human suffering they cause, in the impossibility of controlling their effects in time and space, and in the threat they pose to the environment, to future generations, and indeed to the survival of humanity; thus, the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is their total elimination and assuring that they will never be produced again.

Since then, nuclear disarmament has always been the highest global priority. The recent intensified international efforts, represented, in part, in the first-ever high-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament, on 26 September 2013, and the three conferences on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons, in 2013 and 2014, suggest that this 70-year old global demand continues to be pursued with determination and strong resolve.

Likewise, since the entry into force of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1970, nuclear disarmament is also a 45-year old explicit legal obligation, for the realization of which certain decisions have been made and agreements reached within the context of the Review Conferences of the Parties to the Treaty. Adoption of the 13 practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement article VI of the Treaty by the 2000 Review Conference and a 22-point action plan on nuclear disarmament by the 2010 Review Conference are among such decisions.

Even though the incomplete, selective and discriminatory implementation of the provisions of this Treaty is considered one of its challenges that needs to be effectively addressed, its main implementation challenge is the lack of real progress in the fulfilment, by all the nuclear-weapon States, of nuclear disarmament obligations under article VI of the Treaty. At the same time, the failure of the Treaty to gain a universal character remains a serious challenge to its effectiveness that needs to be addressed.

Pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, there is also a dire need to grant to all non-nuclear-weapon States effective, universal, unconditional, non-discriminatory and irrevocable legally binding security assurances against the

use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under all circumstances, especially taking into account the fact that the current frameworks to provide such assurances are very limited, conditional, insufficient and, above all, can justify the use of such weapons by resorting to such concepts as "defending the vital interests" of a nuclear-weapon State or its "allies and partners".

Without doubt, the Advisory Opinion of 8 July 1996 of the International Court of Justice on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons is of the utmost importance in highlighting the legal obligation of the nuclear-weapon States on nuclear disarmament under article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The negotiating history and the text and context of the Treaty, as well as the content of the outcome documents of its Review Conferences, as subsequent practice, confirm that the most important incentive for the States negotiating the Treaty was to achieve the objective of a nuclear-weapon-free world. They also confirm that the fulfilment of this obligation is neither conditional nor optional. The text of the Treaty is clear in this regard when the parties thereto declare, in its preamble, "their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament" and urge "the cooperation of all States in the attainment of this objective". Moreover, through its article VI, each of the parties to the Treaty undertakes "to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament".

Indeed, the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty have ratified it based on this essential assumption that the implementation of the Treaty would and should lead to a nuclear-weapon-free world. Definitely, they never intended to become party to a Treaty that divides States into the nuclear-weapon-haves and the nuclear-weapon-have-nots and legitimizes the indefinite possession of such inhumane weapons by certain Powers. The Islamic Republic of Iran strongly believes that the purpose of the Treaty is not only to prevent the non-nuclear-weapon States from acquiring nuclear weapons, it is also to disarm nuclear-weapon States. The Treaty is about the elimination of all nuclear weapons, which is the only absolute guarantee against this scourge. The main purpose of the Treaty is that no one should have nuclear weapons. Accordingly, Iran continues to strongly reject any assumption that the indefinite extension of the Treaty implies the indefinite possession by the nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear arsenals or that they are legitimately held weapons. Any such assumption is incompatible with the object and purpose of the Treaty.

In the view of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the main challenge of nuclear disarmament is the lack of genuine political will by the nuclear-weapon States to fulfil their legal obligations under article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and implement their unequivocal undertakings to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals. The persistence of this situation definitely will add to the already existing frustration of the non-nuclear-weapon States, gradually erode the validity and credibility of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, lessen its effectiveness and negatively impact international peace and security, which certainly is not in the common interest of the present and future generations.

Accordingly, the Islamic Republic of Iran asserts that taking all necessary practical measures for the total elimination of all nuclear weapons worldwide, including pursuing in good faith and bringing to a conclusion negotiations leading

to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control, as unanimously concluded by the International Court of Justice in its Advisory Opinion, is a legal obligation to which all States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty are committed under its article VI.

While expressing deep disappointment over the lack of tangible progress so far in the implementation of the obligations under article VI of this Treaty and the unequivocal commitments under the 13 practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to implement article VI of the Treaty and the 2010 action plan on nuclear disarmament, Iran highlights the importance of strong support, expressed at the first-ever high-level meeting of the United Nations General Assembly on nuclear disarmament, on 26 September 2013, for taking urgent and effective measures to achieve the total elimination of nuclear weapons, and urgent compliance with the legal obligations and the fulfilment of the commitments undertaken on nuclear disarmament.

In the view of the Islamic Republic of Iran, lack of practical progress on the fulfilment of such obligations and unequivocal commitments cannot continue indefinitely, and therefore their implementation should be time-bound. To that end, Iran believes that all States should urgently commence the negotiations, in the Conference on Disarmament, for the early conclusion of a comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons, to prohibit their possession, development, production, acquisition, testing, stockpiling, transfer, use or threat of use and to provide for their destruction, as called for by the United Nations General Assembly in resolutions 68/32, 69/38 and 70/34. In this context, Iran is of the view that the United Nations high-level international conference on nuclear disarmament in 2018, the convening of which also has been decided by the United Nations General Assembly in its resolution 68/32, provides the international community of States with a valuable opportunity to review the progress made in nuclear disarmament. This conference can be utilized to advance the objective of a nuclear-weapon-free world, including through making concrete decisions, such as identifying a deadline for the total elimination of nuclear weapons worldwide.

While expressing deep disappointment at the act of two nuclear-weapon States depositories of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, namely the United States and the United Kingdom, along with Canada, in blocking the adoption of a substantive outcome document for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to this Treaty, and particularly over the fact that this has been carried out through disregarding the views of almost all parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty only to appease the Israeli regime that is the only non-party to this Treaty in the Middle East, the Islamic Republic of Iran highlights the importance of the three-phased plan of action for the total elimination of nuclear weapons, which was put forward by the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty during the 2015 Review Conference of the Treaty, and consists of concrete steps, particularly through the negotiation and adoption of a comprehensive nuclear weapons convention which includes a phased programme and a specified time frame for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

As the International Court of Justice, in its advisory opinion of 8 July 1996 on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons, decided, "there is in neither customary nor conventional international law any specific authorization of the threat or use of nuclear weapons" and "the threat or use of nuclear weapons would

generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law". Therefore, any use or threat of use of any type of nuclear weapons, under any circumstances, would be contrary to Article 2 (4) of the Charter of the United Nations, the general principles of international law and the rules and regulations of international humanitarian law, and would constitute a crime against humanity. Iran asserts that, even resorting to Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations cannot, in any way and under any condition, justify the use or threat of use of these inhumane weapons.

Moreover, any use or threat of use of nuclear weapons would seriously undermine the very foundations, integrity, credibility and thus sustainability of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and would be contrary to its object and purpose. Accordingly, all the nuclear-weapon States should seriously refrain, under any and all circumstances and without any discrimination or exception, from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty.

Lebanon

[Original: Arabic
8 April 2016]

Lebanon wishes to emphasize that:

It does not possess or produce weapons of mass destruction. It complies with the United Nations resolutions in that regard and is opposed to the legality of the threat or use of such weapons;

It welcomes and supports all initiatives aimed at bringing about general and complete disarmament, especially in the Middle East, and emphasizes that the region should be free of weapons of mass destruction. It is, however, concerned at the failure of Israel to comply with international law. Israel maintains a nuclear arsenal that constitutes a constant threat to all the States of the region and consequently to international peace and security;

It is essential for the Arab States to continue to call for the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, because that is the only available option for coping with the dangers which the nuclear armaments of Israel and its other weapons of mass destruction represent for international peace and Arab national security;

The international community should continue to demand that all States in the region, including Israel, should sign treaties on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and nuclear weapons;

It calls for the introduction and development of the use of peaceful nuclear technologies in all fields that serve sustainable development and that the various needs of the Arab States be taken into account.

Mexico

[Original: Spanish
27 April 2016]

Given that the establishment of the United Nations coincided with the start of the nuclear age, the interest of Member States in disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament, is central to the work of the Organization.

Although Mexico does not possess nuclear weapons, it is aware of the devastating short- and long-term effects of an intentional or accidental nuclear detonation on the population and the environment, not only at the regional but also at the global level. The total elimination of nuclear weapons has therefore been a key element of Mexico's position in multilateral contexts, in line with its foreign policy and the principles contained in the Charter of the United Nations.

For those reasons, and pursuant to the recommendations of the 1996 advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, Mexico has remained extremely active at the international level with a view to achieving the prohibition and total elimination of nuclear weapons through a legally binding instrument under strict and effective international control.

To that end, independently of the changes Mexico has made in its national legal framework in accordance with the international treaties to which it is a party, it has taken various multilateral steps, in its national capacity and in conjunction with like-minded countries, to hold and successfully conclude the multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament that are an obligation for parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Mexico therefore participates actively and decisively in the various multilateral and regional forums that deal with the issue of nuclear disarmament. At the seventieth session of the General Assembly, Mexico, both in its national capacity and together with other States, submitted draft resolutions in the First Committee on the following topics in the area:

(i) Taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations

(ii) Humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons

(iii) Humanitarian pledge for the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons

(iv) Ethical imperatives for a nuclear-weapon-free world

(v) Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments

(vi) Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

In particular, Mexico submitted, coordinated and facilitated the resolution entitled "Taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations", co-sponsored by 28 countries,[6] which establishes an open-ended working group that

[6] Austria, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Georgia, Ghana, Guatemala, Honduras, Ireland, Jamaica, Kenya, Liechtenstein, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mexico, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Palau, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, South Africa, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of).

will convene under the rules of procedure of the General Assembly, with the possibility of voting, inclusive participation and representatives of international organizations and civil society, with the mandate of substantively addressing new legal norms and measures in nuclear disarmament.

The open-ended working group will convene in 2016 in Geneva for 15 days, meeting on three occasions: from 22 to 26 February, from 2 to 13 May and in the week of 22 August.

Mexico has stated that while there can be no progress in disarmament in the absence of the nuclear-weapon countries, the open-ended working group should focus on the progress that can be made by non-nuclear-weapon States, namely the development of new norms and the prevention of a humanitarian catastrophe. Mexico also participated in the open-ended working group as a member of the New Agenda Coalition, the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States and the Humanitarian Initiative, and as a Member State of one of the nuclear-weapon-free zones, which reiterated their support for nuclear disarmament.

In addition, together with Austria, the Holy See, Ireland and South Africa, Mexico has since 2012 promoted the approach known as the humanitarian initiative, which emerged as an alternative to the frustration of the non-nuclear-weapon States and of civil society with the lack of progress towards nuclear disarmament.

At the three Conferences on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons, held in Oslo in 2013 and in Nayarit, Mexico, and Vienna in 2014, the catastrophic consequences of one or more accidental or intentional nuclear detonations for and the associated threats to the existence of the environment, ecosystems, climate change, development, global health and food security were demonstrated through scientific data and analysis.

At the Vienna Conference, Austria pledged to take steps to fill the legal gap for the stigmatization and prohibition of nuclear weapons with a view to their elimination, in view of the harm that would result from an accidental or intentional nuclear detonation, and invited other countries to do likewise. The Community of Latin American and Caribbean States endorsed the Austrian Pledge on 29 January 2015, at the initiative of Mexico, becoming the first regional body to do so. At the time of submission of the present report, the Austrian Pledge has been endorsed by 127 countries and renamed the Humanitarian Pledge.

Although no final document was adopted at the ninth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the major outcome of the review cycle was the Humanitarian Initiative. 159 countries endorsed the Pledge, which states that the basis of disarmament and non-proliferation is concern about the impact of nuclear weapons, which must not be used again under any circumstances.

Mexico welcomes the clear shift in the parameters, approach, tone and balance of the current debates regarding the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons, and the commitment of States on the matter. The non-nuclear-weapon States today are more empowered to demand our security on an equal footing.

Portugal

[Original: English
31 May 2016]

Portugal is committed to promoting disarmament and non-proliferation of all kinds of weapons of mass destruction, and in this context is part of several of the major international initiatives that promote disarmament and non-proliferation. The issue of nuclear weapons is one that raises major concerns in Portugal, which is engaged in active multilateral efforts to promote nuclear disarmament and nuclear safety. Our participation in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the Convention on Nuclear Safety, the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, and its Amendment, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Australia Group and the Nuclear Suppliers Group, reflects the Portuguese commitment to this endeavour and to the obligations of article VI.

On this matter, and recalling the Portuguese commitments to all its international partners, in terms of the follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons, Portugal reaffirms that the principles established in that document are well entrenched in Portuguese doctrine regarding nuclear issues.

Portugal is of the view that a nuclear weapons ban convention could ultimately be pursued as long as negotiations start regarding a treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear devices on the basis of document CD/1299 and the mandate contained therein.

Qatar

[Original: English
27 April 2016]

The Permanent Mission of the State of Qatar to the United Nations presents its compliments to the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs and, in reference to the note dated 10 February 2016 (ODA/23-2016/1CJ) seeking the views of Member States regarding General Assembly resolution 70/56, entitled "Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons", has the honour to communicate the views of the State of Qatar on the said resolution, which read as follows:

(i) The State of Qatar believes that the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is contrary to the international law applicable in armed conflicts, notably the principles and norms of international humanitarian law.

(ii) The State of Qatar is fully convinced that the only guarantee against the use of nuclear weapons is the complete elimination of such weapons. It therefore stresses the significance of the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, which recalled in its unanimously adopted decision that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.

(iii) The State of Qatar is of the view that the implementation of the three measures included in The Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the 22 actions included in the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference constitutes a positive factor that should be accelerated. Hence the importance of establishing an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament in the framework of the Disarmament Conference in order to identify the steps necessary to achieve the objective of complete nuclear disarmament.

(iv) Qatar is a nuclear weapon-free State that does not possess any such weapons nor their means of delivery. It does not harbour any ambitions or intentions to possess or develop nuclear weapons-related programmes. It has not provided any scientific, technical or material assistance to any party seeking to possess or develop a nuclear weapon. It has not authorized any activities related to such weapons on its territory.

(v) The State of Qatar believes in the importance of the peaceful use of nuclear energy and in preventing its diversion towards military uses. In that spirit, it has joined the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons on 3 April 1989 and signed the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency on 19 January 2009. It has also signed the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty on 24 September 1996 and ratified it on 3 March 1997. Qatar has also presented a request for membership in the Disarmament Conference and is currently an observer State therein.

(vi) Qatar has participated in the 2013 Oslo Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons, the second session of the Conference, held in Mexico in 2014, and the third session of the Conference, held in Vienna in December 2014, as part of its belief that humanity needs to recognize the threats posed by nuclear weapons, and that such awareness should be reflected in a concrete manner in the efforts that must be made to save humanity from the scourge of such weapons, and towards the ultimate objective of achieving a nuclear weapon-free world.

(vii) The State of Qatar has set up the National Committee for the Prohibition of Weapons for the implementation of treaties related to weapons of mass destruction. The Committee provides training and awareness services at the national, regional and international level.

(viii) The National Committee for the Prohibition of Weapons holds annual awareness workshops and organizes annual research paper and poster competitions for high school and college students on the threats posed by nuclear weapons.

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United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean

Report of the Secretary-General

Summary

The present report provides an overview of the activities of the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean from July 2015 to June 2016.

During that period, the Regional Centre undertook over 60 technical, legal and policy assistance activities to assist Latin American and Caribbean States, at their request, with the implementation of international instruments relating to conventional arms and weapons of mass destruction.

With a view to supporting the implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (Programme of Action on Small Arms) and the International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons (International Tracing Instrument), the Regional Centre provided technical training to more than 550 personnel of the national authorities of Member States on the marking, tracing, stockpile management and destruction of small arms. Through community outreach initiatives and technical assistance, the Centre raised the awareness of the general public and a number of private security companies about small arms control and preventing armed violence. The Centre trained some 120 national officials from Central and South American States on the implementation of the Arms Trade Treaty.

* A/71/50.

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During the reporting period, the Regional Centre provided legislative, policy and capacity-building assistance to over 150 national authorities in the Caribbean to enhance the implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) on preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery to non-State actors. The Centre also provided capacity-building assistance to three Caribbean States to prevent proliferation in the context of maritime and port security.

The Secretary-General expresses his gratitude to the Member States and other partners that supported the Regional Centre's operation and programmes with financial and in-kind contributions, and calls upon those in a position to do so to make voluntary contributions to the Centre in order to sustain its activities in response to the increasing requests for assistance and cooperation by Member States in the region.

I. Introduction

1. In its resolution 70/63, the General Assembly reiterated its strong support for the role of the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean in the promotion of peace, disarmament and development among its Member States, and encouraged the Centre to further develop programmes in all countries of the region in the important areas of peace, disarmament and development, and to provide, upon request and in accordance with its mandate, support to Member States' initiatives in those areas at the regional and subregional levels.

2. The General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to submit a report on the implementation of the resolution at its seventy-first session. In the present report, submitted pursuant to that request, the main activities carried out by the Regional Centre from July 2015 to June 2016 are highlighted. A financial statement on the status of the Trust Fund for the Centre in 2015 is contained in the annex to the present report.

II. Functioning and mandate

3. The Regional Centre, located in Lima, was established in 1987, pursuant to General Assembly resolution 41/60 J. It is mandated to provide, at their request, substantive support for the initiatives and other activities of the Member States in the region for the implementation of measures for peace and disarmament and for the promotion of economic and social development.

III. Main areas of activity

4. The Regional Centre undertook more than 60 technical, legal and training assistance activities to support the efforts by States in the region in their implementation of disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation instruments and adherence to international standards and norms in those fields.

5. The Regional Centre continued its specialized training and capacity-building programme for national security sector personnel on combating illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons. As part of that programme, the Centre provided technical assistance to Latin American States in the destruction of over 2,000 confiscated weapons and in the marking of some 1,400 small arms. The Centre trained over 100 personnel from private security companies on small arms control. The Centre also promoted more effective tracing of illicit small arms by training 75 forensic firearms examiners and laboratory specialists from Member States in the region. In addition, the Centre provided training to personnel from over 120 national authorities in the region with a view to strengthening the capacity of States to implement the Arms Trade Treaty.

6. As part of its outreach efforts, the Regional Centre published the second edition of its study on the impact of stray bullets and carried out public risk awareness campaigns on small arms and explosives in respect of over 1,000 citizens.

7. The Regional Centre assisted States in the region in their implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), in particular with regard to issues relating to national legislation, maritime border security, combating proliferation financing and national action plans.

8. The Regional Centre continued its efforts to promote the participation of women in disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation initiatives, in line with General Assembly resolution 65/69 on women, disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control. Overall, 29 per cent of participants in the Centre's activities were women, an increase from the previous reporting period.

9. With the adoption of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, the Regional Centre will align its activities to support the realization of the Sustainable Development Goals, in particular the relevant parts of Goal 16.

A. Public security programme

1. Promoting peaceful coexistence at the local level

10. As part of a three-year inter agency project by the United Nations country team in Peru aimed at promoting peaceful coexistence in Peru by strengthening human security and community resilience, the Regional Centre assisted in the strengthening of local capacity to combat illicit weapons trafficking. The Centre provided expertise on small arms control and armed violence reduction and promoted coordination between local and municipal authorities in addressing small arms control challenges. The project, funded by the United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security, is an example of the "One United Nations" approach.

11. Under the project, the Regional Centre provided technical assistance to the national regulatory entity for security services, firearms, ammunition and explosives for civil use of Peru in destroying in excess of 2,000 small arms confiscated by the national police in Trujillo in September 2015.

12. In November 2015, the Regional Centre supported the awareness-raising campaign led by the national regulatory entity on the responsible use of pyrotechnics and the prevention of accidents in Trujillo. The campaign involved innovative theatre presentations in schools and street parades involving young volunteers, with more than 1,000 participants, including 400 women.

13. The Regional Centre organized a seminar for some 80 representatives of local government authorities, law enforcement and public offices in Trujillo in February 2016 to discuss public security policies, in particular best practices in armed violence reduction. The policy options and best practices were intended to be considered by local authorities in the development of programmes and plans at the local level to prevent and reduce armed violence.

14. In addition, the Regional Centre provided its expertise on armed violence reduction and small arms and ammunition control to over 100 representatives from local and district governments, security and justice institutions and civil society organizations.

15. In May 2016, as part of the Global Week of Action against Gun Violence, the Regional Centre launched its second study on cases involving stray bullets as reported by the media in Latin America and the Caribbean during 2014-2015. The

study provided additional information on the impact of stray bullets and the role that small arms control measures can play in preventing such incidents. Analysis of the study showed that women and young people were disproportionately affected by stray bullets.

2. Stockpile management and marking of small arms held by private security companies

16. In the context of the increased privatization of security in Latin America and the Caribbean, the Regional Centre, in collaboration with the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, continued to implement its project on strengthening the capacities of the Governments of Member States to control small arms under the ownership of private security companies and to promote good governance in that sector. The programme promotes the application of the International Small Arms Control Standards, the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines and the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers.

17. The Regional Centre and the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces undertook a regional assessment of the privatization of security, codes of conduct and related small arms control measures with a view to developing a shared understanding of the progress made and challenges faced in that area by Latin American and Caribbean Member States. The assessment serves as a tool for Member States to promote good governance, the rule of law and respect for human rights in the private security sector.

18. As part of the project, the Regional Centre organized workshops for personnel of over 100 national authorities and senior managers from 12 private security companies in El Salvador and Peru. The workshops were focused on the sharing of good practices and international standards in ensuring adequate physical security and stockpile management of small arms, and were followed up with technical support on improving weapons stockpile facilities.

19. In addition, the Regional Centre supported the marking of some 1,400 weapons owned by private security companies in El Salvador and Peru, with a view to strengthening the capacity of the national authorities to control small arms effectively and to facilitate tracing in case of theft or loss.

3. Improving small arms tracing capacity

20. A number of Caribbean States requested the assistance of the Regional Centre to strengthen their national ballistics systems in order to combat illicit trafficking in small arms, light weapons and ammunition, and to contribute to the implementation of the International Tracing Instrument and the Programme of Action on Small Arms. The Centre's programme is aimed at assessing capacities and needs, as well as providing technical training, equipment and standard operating procedures, to the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, the Dominican Republic, Guyana, Jamaica, Saint Kitts and Nevis and Trinidad and Tobago.

21. Eight national forensic ballistic capabilities assessments were carried out, contributing to the development of eight national plans of action. To assist States in implementing the action plans, the Regional Centre held regional and national training courses and seminars for over 260 participants in the Caribbean States. The

courses and seminars reinforced national forensic procedures for tracing illicit trafficking in small arms and prosecuting traffickers.

B. Supporting the implementation of multilateral instruments relating to conventional arms and weapons of mass destruction

1. Arms Trade Treaty

22. The Regional Centre continued to strengthen capacity through its Arms Trade Treaty implementation course. Three training courses were conducted for some 70 national authority personnel responsible for arms imports and exports in Guatemala, Panama and Uruguay. The courses were aimed at assisting States in developing standardized national control lists, assessing the risk of and responding to trafficking in and diversion of conventional arms and offering model standardized end-user certificates.

23. The Regional Centre also organized national round tables in El Salvador, in December 2015, and in Costa Rica, in May 2016, for a total of 50 national authority personnel in charge of arms trade controls. At the round tables recommended guidelines were provided on the establishment of a national control authority responsible for arms trade in compliance with the provisions of the Arms Trade Treaty, and international standards and good practices were highlighted.

2. Security Council resolution 1540 (2004)

24. The Regional Centre provided support, at their request, to several Caribbean States, namely, Belize, the Dominican Republic, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago, in their implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004). The support included legal and technical assistance for national authorities in those States to update legislative frameworks and define national priorities for the implementation of the resolution. The measures concerned were aimed at strengthening the capacity of security sector personnel in dealing with sensitive weapons of mass destruction-related dual-use goods and at responding effectively to weapons of mass destruction-related incidents at maritime ports.

25. The Regional Centre provided technical assistance to Belize, the Dominican Republic, and Trinidad and Tobago in the development of national action plans for the implementation of the resolution and in preparing national implementation reports.

26. The Regional Centre also provided support to the Dominican Republic in drafting a new law to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and to strengthen the implementation of the resolution. Legal drafting workshops and consultations were conducted with national experts on weapons of mass destruction and members of the ad hoc national multisectoral committee.

27. In response to a request from Trinidad and Tobago, the Regional Centre developed recommended guidelines for the adoption of measures to prevent the financing of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The guidelines were presented to 30 national authority personnel in June 2016 during a national seminar.

28. In collaboration with the International Maritime Organization, the Regional Centre organized three technical tabletop exercises in Trinidad and Tobago, in August 2015, Belize, in December 2015, and Jamaica, in June 2016, on risk

management in the maritime domain. More than 50 national authority personnel participated in the exercises. Crisis and risk management training, together with the development of protocols and contingency plans, were highlighted by the three beneficiary States as priorities in the field of maritime security and in preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

29. The Regional Centre, with financial support from Canada, expanded its assistance on the implementation of the resolution to an additional five countries: Antigua and Barbuda, Grenada, Guyana, Peru and Suriname. The activities in those countries will be aimed at strengthening the national legal frameworks through weapons of mass destruction-related legislative assistance, and support for strengthened export control and border security measures.

IV. Staffing, financing and administration

A. Finances

30. In accordance with General Assembly resolution 41/60 J, the Regional Centre was established on the basis of existing resources and voluntary contributions made by Member States and interested organizations for its core and programme activities. In 2015, voluntary contributions to the Centre's Trust Fund were received in the amount of $ 4,277,835. The Centre was also the beneficiary of funds made available through the United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security ($148,479.69), with the support of the regional government of La Libertad in Peru. The Secretary-General expresses his gratitude to the Centre's donors, in particular the Governments of Canada, Germany and the United States of America, for their continued financial support. Those contributions enabled the Centre to continue to assist Member States in the region, at their request.

31. The Secretary-General also expresses his appreciation to Guyana, Mexico, Peru and Spain for their financial contributions to the Regional Centre. He continues to encourage financial and in-kind contributions to the Centre from Latin American and Caribbean States as a clear indication of the value that Member States attribute to the Centre's expertise and technical assistance.

32. The Regional Centre also enjoyed close cooperation with its partners, such as the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, the United Nations Development Programme, the United Nations Population Fund, the Pan American Health Organization, the Expert Group of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), the Caribbean Community, the Organization of American States, the International Maritime Organization, the United States Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces and the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation. These partners provided the Regional Centre with in-kind or financial contributions, which greatly assisted in the implementation of its activities.

33. The Secretary-General wishes to thank all States and partners for their generous contributions to and support for the Regional Centre and encourages their continuous support to ensure that the Centre can continue to provide technical and capacity-building assistance to Member States in the region, at their request, in

fulfilling its mandate. Information on the status of the Trust Fund for the Centre for 2015 is contained in the annex to the present report.

B. Staffing and administration

34. During the reporting period, the Regional Centre recruited additional programmatic and administrative support staff for its public security and non-proliferation and arms control programmes. In particular, a Caribbean-based regional security adviser will support the provision of small arms assistance to the subregion and an international legal specialist will support the provision of assistance on the implementation of instruments on weapons of mass destruction, including Security Council resolution 1540 (2004). The Centre continued its cooperation with the United Nations Volunteer Programme through the recruitment of two volunteers.

35. The Regional Centre began the implementation of its 2016-2018 strategic plan, including a broadening of its donor portfolio in support of new projects and the establishment of new regional and international partnerships.

V. Conclusion

36. During the reporting period, the Regional Centre undertook more than 60 substantive activities to support States in their implementation of the Programme of Action on Small Arms, the International Tracing Instrument, the Arms Trade Treaty and Security Council resolution 1540 (2004).

37. The Regional Centre continued to expand its technical assistance in areas ranging from small arms and ammunition tracing and combating trafficking to improving physical security and stockpile management. The Centre also continued to support States in the strengthening of national frameworks on import/export controls for conventional weapons and dual-use goods. The Centre supported States in their efforts to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction through the provision of legal assistance and capacity-building workshops, including on maritime and port security.

38. The Regional Centre promoted the participation and role of women in disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control by ensuring a minimum number of female participants at all of its events, with around 640 women enjoying practical assistance during the reporting period.

39. The Secretary-General reiterates his calls upon those Member States and other partners in a position to do so to provide the Regional Centre with the financial and in-kind support, including direct financial contributions from Latin American and Caribbean States, necessary for it to continue to carry out its mandate effectively and serve the needs of Member States in the region. The Secretary-General also encourages States to continue to fully utilize the Centre's expertise and experience in their joint efforts to promote peace, security and disarmament in the region.

Annex

Status of the Trust Fund for the United Nations Regional Centre for Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean for 2015

(United States dollars)

Reserves and fund balance, 1 January 2015	**2 191 478**
Prior-year adjustment	(941 408)[a]
Accumulated surplus/(deficit)	1 250 070
Revenue	
Voluntary contributions	4 277 835[b]
Investment revenue	9 576
Other exchange revenue	2 043
Total revenue	**4 289 454**
Expenses	
Operating expenses	1 623 713
Depreciation and amortization	511
Total expenses	**1 624 224**
Surplus/(deficit)	2 665 230
Accumulated surplus	**3 915 300**[c]

[a] Consists of contribution from Germany in the amount of $153,611 for 2015.

[b] During the reporting period, voluntary contributions were received from Canada ($1,133,550), Germany ($735,499), Guyana ($1,031), Mexico ($5,000), Peru ($25,000), Spain ($22,119) and the United States of America ($2,355,636).

[c] Consists of accumulated surplus as at 1 January 2015, plus revenue received, less expenses during the year.

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Item 98 (d) of the preliminary list*
Review and implementation of the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly

United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa

Report of the Secretary-General

Summary

The present report contains an account of the activities undertaken by the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa from July 2015 to June 2016.

During the reporting period, the Regional Centre continued to assist Member States, at their request, and intergovernmental and civil society organizations in Africa to promote peace, security and disarmament.

In response to the continued challenge to peace, security and stability posed by the proliferation of illicit small arms and light weapons in the region, in particular in Central Africa, the Horn of Africa and the Sahel, the Regional Centre focused its work on providing assistance to Member States, at their request, to combat the illicit trafficking in and prevent the diversion of such weapons. It also provided assistance in the implementation of the Arms Trade Treaty and of instruments relating to weapons of mass destruction, including Security Council resolution 1540 (2004). In doing so, the Centre partnered with the African Union, subregional organizations, civil society organizations and other United Nations entities.

The Regional Centre continued to provide substantive support on disarmament issues to the States members of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa at their ministerial and governmental expert meetings.

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The Regional Centre strengthened its own capacity to respond to requests from Member States in Africa in the fields of disarmament, peace and security through enhanced project development and resource mobilization. The Centre also implemented its communication strategy by developing information and outreach material and by proactively reaching out to stakeholders.

The Secretary-General thanks those Member States and other institutions that made financial and in-kind contributions to the Regional Centre, enabling it to fulfil its mandate during the reporting period, and calls upon all Member States and other stakeholders to continue to make contributions.

I. Introduction

1. In its resolution 70/66, the General Assembly noted with appreciation the tangible achievements and impact of the assistance provided by the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa and welcomed the continental dimensions of its activities in response to the evolving needs of African Member States and the region's new and emerging challenges in the areas of disarmament, peace and security, including maritime security.

2. The present report, submitted pursuant to the request contained in that resolution for the Secretary-General to submit a report to the General Assembly at its seventy-first session on the implementation of the resolution, covers the activities of the Regional Centre from July 2015 to June 2016. Information on the status of the Trust Fund for the Centre in 2015 is contained in the annex.

II. Functioning and mandate

3. The Regional Centre was established in 1986 in Lomé pursuant to General Assembly resolution 40/151 G. The year 2016 marks its thirtieth anniversary. The Centre functions on the basis of existing resources within the Secretariat and of voluntary contributions that Member States and other donors may offer.

4. During the reporting period, the Regional Centre implemented its programme of work in the following main areas: peace and security; conventional arms, including small arms and light weapons; weapons of mass destruction; information and outreach; and cooperation and partnerships with regional and subregional organizations and other entities.

III. Programmes

5. The Regional Centre provides support and technical assistance to Member States in Africa, at their request, in the promotion of disarmament, peace and security through capacity-building and training programmes, advocacy, research and information sharing. It works in partnership with the African Union, other intergovernmental organizations, academic and research institutions and civil society organizations in the implementation of its programmes, projects and other activities. In the light of the specific nature of security and disarmament issues in Africa, the Centre continued to place emphasis on activities aimed at preventing the illicit trafficking in and proliferation of small arms and light weapons.

6. The Regional Centre continued to raise the awareness of African Member States of issues relating to weapons of mass destruction, in particular by assisting in implementing disarmament and non-proliferation instruments, such as Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery to non-State actors and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction.

A. Peace and security

7. The Regional Centre initiated discussions with the African Union Commission on the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, in particular Sustainable Development Goal 16 and, thereunder, Goals 16.1 and 16.4 on the reduction of violence and illicit flows of arms. The Centre is also examining synergies and complementarities with the implementation of the African Union's Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want and the aspiration of silencing the guns in Africa by 2020.

8. The Regional Centre continued to contribute to the implementation of the United Nations integrated strategy for the Sahel through the provision of technical assistance to improve small arms control and physical security and stockpile management. It actively participated in the inter-agency coordination and exchange of information efforts led by the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Sahel and the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel, providing expert advice to Member States, United Nations missions and other stakeholders on issues relating to disarmament in general and weapons stockpile management, safety and security in particular.

9. The Regional Centre provided substantive support to the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa at its forty-first and forty-second ministerial meetings, held in Libreville in November 2015 and Bangui in June 2016. The Centre updated the 11 States members of the Standing Advisory Committee on disarmament developments at the international, regional and subregional levels and on international and regional efforts in promoting and supporting the implementation of disarmament instruments.

10. At the request of the Standing Advisory Committee, the Regional Centre continued to examine the adverse consequences of the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons for maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea and will report to the Committee thereon.

11. The Secretary-General reiterates his call upon the Member States of the region to ratify the Central African Convention for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition and All Parts and Components That Can Be Used for Their Manufacture, Repair and Assembly. To date, five States have ratified the Convention.

B. Small arms and light weapons

12. The Regional Centre supported African Member States, at their request, in implementing global and regional instruments to combat the illicit trade in and proliferation of small arms and light weapons by providing assistance in implementing regional and national action plans on small arms and in strengthening the capacity of Governments and civil society organizations.

13. As an observer member of the African Union-Regions Steering Committee on Small Arms and Light Weapons and Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration, the Regional Centre continued to work closely with the African Union Commission and the regional economic communities and provided its expertise at the sixth meeting of the Steering Committee, held in Abuja in November 2015. The meeting provided an opportunity to reflect on, and draw

lessons from, the challenges and achievements of national, subregional and regional small arms control efforts and to discuss how the Steering Committee could further improve coordination, effectiveness and sustainability.

14. The Regional Centre continued to support the African Union and its member States in the implementation of the African Union Strategy on the Control of Illicit Proliferation, Circulation and Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons, which serves as a framework to improve the coordination of activities aimed at combating and preventing the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects on the continent. The Centre also continued to participate as an observer in the Steering Committee of the African Union-European Union project to fight against the illicit accumulation and trafficking of firearms in Africa in the implementation of the second phase of the project.

15. As part of its contribution to implementing the United Nations integrated strategy for the Sahel, the Regional Centre concluded an assessment survey of the small arms situation in countries of the Sahel and neighbouring countries, which was jointly carried out with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and received technical assistance from the Small Arms Survey and the Group for Research and Information on Peace and Security. The survey results directly contributed to a three-year project to improve physical security and stockpile management measures in the Sahel to reduce the risk of diversion of small arms and light weapons and ammunition, as well as accidental explosions at ammunition sites.

16. The aforementioned project was launched during the Wilton Park conference on the theme "Towards better physical security and stockpile management in the Sahel region", organized by Wilton Park and the Regional Centre in March 2016 in Lomé. The Centre organized national consultations with the national commissions on small arms and light weapons of Burkina Faso, in May 2016, the Niger, in May and June 2016, and Nigeria, in June 2016. The consultations were aimed at developing national legislative and administrative measures for managing weapons and identifying priority stockpiling sites to serve as pilot sites for rehabilitation. Additional consultations are planned in 2016 for Chad, Mali and Mauritania. The initiatives were coordinated through the platform established by the African Union Commission, with the support of the Government of Germany, as part of the Nouakchott Process on the enhancement of security cooperation and the operationalization of the African Peace and Security Architecture in the Sahelo-Saharan region.

17. The Regional Centre's sustained assistance to the National Commission on Small Arms and Light Weapons of Mali also supported the implementation of the United Nations integrated strategy for the Sahel. Its assistance focused on building the capacity of the Commission to mark and register small arms and light weapons, by providing marking equipment training to security and defence officers working on marking and registration. The project resulted in the marking of 1,780 State-owned arms. Technical assistance was also provided by the National Commission on Small Arms of Côte d'Ivoire, thereby promoting regional cooperation and assistance. The Centre also assisted with national awareness-raising programmes in Mali on the importance of marking and registration vis-à-vis private security companies and makers of artisanal weapons.

18. To assist in the implementation of the International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons and the African Union Strategy on the Control of Illicit

Proliferation, Circulation and Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons, the Regional Centre collaborated with the African Union Commission in the organization of a training course, in October 2015, on the identification and tracing of small arms and light weapons and their ammunition for the States members of the Economic Community of Central African States. The training was supported by experts from the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali and the non-governmental organization Conflict Armament Research.

19. To improve State capacity to prevent the acquisition of arms by terrorist groups, the Regional Centre, within the framework of the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, developed a project on strengthening the control of government-held small arms and light weapons and preventing the diversion of those weapons to such groups. The Centre is planning to pilot the project in the countries of the Lake Chad basin (Cameroon, Chad, the Niger and Nigeria), with financial support from Switzerland and the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Centre.

20. With a view to strengthening coordination with other stakeholders in these areas, the Regional Centre contributed substantively to initiatives on small arms and light weapons control issues organized by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, UNDP, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Mines Advisory Group.

C. Arms Trade Treaty

21. An analysis of synergies and complementarities between the Arms Trade Treaty and the ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition and Other Related Materials was undertaken in cooperation with and at the request of the ECOWAS Commission. The Regional Centre also collaborated with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and the African Union Commission in convening a workshop on the implementation of the obligations under the Treaty relating to human rights and gender-based violence. It resulted in the identification of specific steps that could assist in the ratification of the Treaty and foster its implementation and the protection of the rights of women against gender-based violence.

22. As part of a project coordinated by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, the Regional Centre concluded the mapping of assistance activities in support of the Arms Trade Treaty implemented in sub-Saharan Africa between 2011 and 2015. The mapping resulted in the compilation of more than 200 activities and an online database (www.att-assistance.org).

D. Weapons of mass destruction

23. The Regional Centre supported Member States in their efforts to implement instruments relating to weapons of mass destruction, including Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery to non-State actors.

24. The Regional Centre provided substantive support to the preparatory meeting for the African Union Review and Assistance Conference on the Implementation of Resolution 1540 (2004) in Africa, held in September 2015, and shared its expertise

during regional events on the resolution organized by the Inter-Parliamentary Union in February 2016 and the African Union Commission, in collaboration with the Office for Disarmament Affairs, in April 2016.

E. Information and outreach

25. As part of its efforts to make disarmament information and materials available to an increasing number of States and stakeholders in the region, the Regional Centre continued to cooperate with the International Organization of la Francophonie in the development of a practitioner's handbook on disarmament in Africa.

26. To sustain momentum for the multi-pronged Agenda 2063 and the aspiration of silencing the guns in Africa by 2020, the Regional Centre, in collaboration with the United Nations Office to the African Union, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and the African Union Commission, organized a high-level panel discussion on building partnerships to silence the guns, held in January 2016. The Centre also participated in a panel discussion on the theme "Silencing the guns: how do African States control small arms and light weapons?", organized by the Institute for Peace and Security Studies at Addis Ababa University in December 2015.

27. On the occasion of International Women's Day (8 March), the Regional Centre briefed participants in the communication network of the Women, Peace and Security Institute of the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre on ways to increase the participation of women in disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control in line with General Assembly resolution 65/69 and Security Council resolution 1325 (2000). The Centre participated in a panel discussion on small arms and light weapons at the Stockholm Forum on Security and Development, co-hosted by the Government of Sweden and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, in April 2016.

28. The Regional Centre continued to implement its communications strategy with the objective of improving outreach and interaction with Member States, regional and subregional organizations, civil society organizations and the public at large regarding its work and priorities. Briefings for the diplomatic corps were organized in Lomé in July 2015 and Addis Ababa in December 2015 to inform diplomats about the work of the Centre and raise their awareness of current disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation challenges in Africa.

29. The Regional Centre's electronic newsletter, "UNREC Focus", is distributed to more than 7,300 global subscribers, providing information about regional disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation issues and the initiatives and activities of the Centre. Furthermore, new interactive features continued to be added to the Centre's website. Between July 2015 and June 2016, the website recorded 82,700 visitors.

30. In commemoration of Disarmament Week (24-30 October), the Regional Centre reached out to all United Nations resident coordinators in Africa and piloted an online platform to provide ideas and resources for commemorative activities. The Centre also organized the screening of a documentary, *The Man Who Saved the World*, for more than 100 young people between 15 and 20 years of age, which was followed by a discussion on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

IV. Staffing, financing and administration

A. Financial situation

31. The Regional Centre was established pursuant to General Assembly resolution 40/151 G on the basis of existing resources and voluntary contributions. In 2015, voluntary contributions to the Trust Fund for the Centre were received in the amount of $1,514,793. Information on the status of the Trust Fund in 2015 is contained in the annex to the present report. Additional contributions were also received during the first half of 2016.

32. The Secretary-General expresses his gratitude to the Governments of Cameroon, France, Germany, Japan, Switzerland, Togo, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America, as well as the European Union, the Economic Community of Central African States, the donor States of the United Nations Trust Facility Supporting Cooperation on Arms Regulation, UNDP, the International Organization of la Francophonie and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, for their financial contributions. The Secretary-General also expresses his appreciation to the Government of Côte d'Ivoire for its in-kind contribution.

B. Staffing

33. The regular budget of the United Nations currently funds the posts of the Director, a Political Affairs Officer and two national support staff. Project staff are funded through voluntary contributions. During the reporting period, the Regional Centre continued its cooperation with the United Nations Volunteers programme. The Secretary-General thanks the Government of Germany for the funding of an associate expert in legal affairs and the Government of the United States for supporting the cost of a national United Nations volunteer through the Trust Fund for Global and Regional Disarmament Activities in support of the implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004).

V. Conclusion

34. During the reporting period, the Regional Centre continued to carry out its programmes, with the support of donors, to provide assistance to African Member States, at their request, in the areas of peace, security and disarmament and enhanced its collaboration with partners, including the African Union and subregional organizations, with a view to achieving synergies in promoting disarmament and non-proliferation objectives in Africa.

35. The Regional Centre assisted Member States, at their request, in strengthening their capacity to combat the illicit trade in and proliferation of small arms and light weapons and in implementing instruments relating to weapons of mass destruction, including Security Council resolution 1540 (2004). Furthermore, the Centre engaged in activities relating to the implementation of the Arms Trade Treaty and conducted outreach initiatives to raise awareness of disarmament and non-proliferation issues.

36. The sustained number of requests for assistance from Member States and regional organizations demonstrated the importance of the work of the Regional Centre in the field of disarmament, arms control, non-proliferation and security in the region. Building on its past work and expertise, the Centre continues to develop and implement new projects and activities that meet the priority needs of Member States on issues within its mandate.

37. In carrying out its programme and activities, the Regional Centre collaborated with key stakeholders and strengthened its continental role by creating networks and partnerships at the regional and subregional levels. The Centre will continue its efforts to maximize the utilization of resources and expertise through cooperation and the sharing of experiences with partner entities in the region.

38. On the occasion of the thirtieth anniversary of the Regional Centre, the Secretary-General calls upon Member States and other donors to provide the Centre with the financial and in-kind support necessary to enable it to continue to fulfil its mandate effectively in serving the needs of African Member States in the fields of peace, security and disarmament.

Annex

Status of the Trust Fund for the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa for 2015

(United States dollars)

Reserves and fund balance, 1 January 2015	**199 214**
Prior-year adjustment	32 422[a]
Accumulated surplus/(deficit)	231 636
Revenue	
Voluntary contributions	1 491 902[b]
Investment revenue	5 457
Total revenue	**1 497 359**
Expenses	
Operating expenses	374 521
Depreciation and amortization	3 822
Total expenses	**378 343**
Surplus/(deficit)	1 119 016
Accumulated surplus	**1 350 652**[c]

[a] Consists of a contribution in the amount of $8,025 from Germany in 2015 and miscellaneous income of $1,961.

[b] Consists of the contributions received from France ($21,882), Germany ($192,774), Switzerland ($200,000), Togo ($61,049), the European Commission ($509,302), the International Organization de la Francophonie ($21,947), the Stockholm International Peace' Research Institute ($19,500) and the United Nations Development Programme ($486,339), less a refund of $20,891 to Oxfam.

[c] Consists of the accumulated surplus as at 1 January 2015, plus revenue received, less expenses, during the year.

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Seventy-first session
Item 97 (b) of the preliminary list*
General and complete disarmament

Further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of an arms race on the seabed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof

Report of the Secretary-General

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* A/71/50.

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I. Introduction

1. At its forty-fourth session, the General Assembly adopted resolution 44/116 O, entitled "Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof", on 15 December 1989, the relevant paragraphs of which read as follows:

> *The General Assembly*,
>
> ...
>
> 8. *Also requests* the Secretary-General to report by 1992, and every three years thereafter until the fourth Review Conference is convened, on technological developments relevant to the Treaty and to the verification of compliance with the Treaty, including dual-purpose technologies for peaceful and specified military ends; in carrying out this task he should draw from official sources and from contributions by States parties to the Treaty and may use the assistance of appropriate expertise;
>
> 9. *Urges* all States parties to the Treaty to assist the Secretary-General accordingly by providing information and drawing his attention to suitable sources.

2. Pursuant to the request contained in paragraph 9 of the resolution, a note verbale was sent to the States parties to the Treaty inviting them to provide information on the subject. At the time of reporting, replies had been received from Jordan and Lebanon and are reproduced in section II. Additional replies received from States parties will be issued as addenda to the present report.

3. The Secretary-General wishes to point out that the information submitted to him by States parties does not provide sufficient official material for him to report on the subject matter on the basis indicated in paragraph 8 of the resolution.

II. Information received from Governments

Jordan

[Original: Arabic]
[5 May 2016]

Introduction

(a) The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan believes that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction constitutes a danger to regional security and stability. This, in turn, leads to mistrust between States and to increased violence in the region, as well as to a greater desire among States to possess such weapons themselves, thereby giving rise to an arms race which could bring destruction and the misfortunes of war upon the entire world. It also has a profoundly negative effect on regional development and the well-being of peoples. Furthermore, maintaining a safe, clean and secure environment is important for the survival of the human race, and exploiting or interfering with that environment could provoke natural disasters in many countries. It is important to maintain the marine

environment — which covers many times more the area of dry land — clean and free of the dangers that would arise from the emplacement of such weapons there. Likewise, nuclear experiments which are incompatible with the land environment and its role in maintaining life should not be carried out on or under the sea, while using the subsoil to carry out nuclear experiments could have unfavourable consequences for all continents and lead to potentially destructive natural disasters. On the basis of this position, Jordan has signed most agreements concerning weapons of mass destruction, including the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof, and it participates actively in all initiatives and agreements concerning disarmament and regional and international security.

(b) Under the terms of the Treaty, States parties undertake not to emplant or emplace — or to assist, encourage or induce any State to emplant or emplace — on the seabed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof, any nuclear weapons or any other types of weapons of mass destruction as well as structures, launching installations or any other facilities specifically designed for storing, testing or using such weapons. Jordan itself possesses no weapons of mass destruction and uses official and international forums to call for the elimination of such weapons, inviting countries of the region and around the world to renounce violence, abandon conflict and establish peace. It also calls on the States of the region to trust one another, to strive for stability and to develop technologies which serve humankind and the welfare of peoples. Jordan believes that such weapons must be converted to serve all nations by, for example, the production of energy for peaceful purposes, or for other ends which bring security and stability to the world. This is preferable to countries seeking to obtain weapons of mass destruction, which can only bring tragedy and misfortune.

Towards a world free of weapons of mass destruction

(a) The existence of weapons of mass destruction constitutes a threat to the survival of the human race, and the only true guarantee against the use or the threat of use of such weapons is their complete elimination and an avowal that they will never be produced again. Maintaining nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction entails the danger of their proliferating and falling into the hands of parties other than nuclear-weapon States. Nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament are mutually reinforcing and equally important, and there must be a continuous and irreversible advance on both those fronts.

(b) The involvement of the international community as a whole is vital to maintaining and promoting international peace and stability. International security is a collective concern requiring a collective commitment to all internationally negotiated disarmament treaties, which have made such a fundamental contribution to global peace and security. At the same time, unilateral or bilateral nuclear disarmament measures would complement the multilateral approach enshrined in nuclear disarmament treaties.

(c) It is important to stress the right of developing countries, without discrimination, to undertake research into the production of nuclear energy and to use such energy for peaceful purposes within the limits set by the International Atomic Energy Agency.

The peaceful use of nuclear energy

(a) The peaceful use of nuclear energy is a right which brings obligations. The right to use nuclear energy peacefully, as a concept, means using it for activities which are peaceful according to the provisions of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Therefore, applying the principle that all countries must be allowed to participate in the peaceful application of nuclear technology, it may be said that the peaceful use of nuclear energy means making such energy available for all countries to use for peaceful purposes. However, it does not follow that such a right is absolute and unconditional. Its exercise must not be for the purpose of causing damage beyond the borders of the State concerned, pursuant to the rules governing the responsibility of States. The legal consequence for any infraction of those rules is the obligation to pay compensation for any damage caused by such use.

The position of Jordan

(a) Jordan has no nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction. It possesses neither the weapons themselves nor their delivery systems and it does not handle them in any way, either directly or indirectly. Nor does it have any ambition or intention to obtain or develop any programme related to such weapons. Moreover, at no time has Jordan ever given any scientific, technical or material assistance to any other party attempting to obtain or develop nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction, nor does it allow any activities related to such weapons to take place on its territory. For this reason, Jordan has signed all relevant international treaties and supports all international and regional efforts aimed at achieving nuclear security and prohibiting the use of weapons of mass destruction. In fact, Jordan was among the first States in the region to sign United Nations treaties exhorting States not to possess such weapons, believing as it does that true peace and stability in the world cannot be achieved except by uniting international and regional efforts to limit the proliferation and use of nuclear weapons and to achieve nuclear security.

Lebanon

[Original: Arabic]
[8 April 2016]

Lebanon wishes to emphasize that it does not possess, manufacture or store nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction and is in compliance with United Nations resolutions on the subject. Therefore, it possesses no nuclear weapons or weapons of mass destruction on the seabed, the ocean floor or in the subsoil thereof.

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Consideration of effective measures to enhance the protection, security and safety of diplomatic and consular missions and representatives

Consideration of effective measures to enhance the protection, security and safety of diplomatic and consular missions and representatives

Report of the Secretary-General

Summary

Six States submitted reports, pursuant to paragraph 10 of General Assembly resolution 69/121, by the established deadline (see section II of the present report).

Four views were received from States pursuant to paragraph 12 of General Assembly resolution 69/121 (see section III).

Five additional States became participants to the instruments relevant to the protection, security and safety of diplomatic and consular missions and representatives (see section IV) since the previous report (A/69/185) on the topic.

* A/71/50.

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I. Introduction

1. On 10 December 2014, the General Assembly adopted resolution 69/121, entitled "Consideration of effective measures to enhance the protection, security and safety of diplomatic and consular missions and representatives". Paragraphs 10, 12 and 13 of the resolution read as follows:

> "*The General Assembly*,
>
> ...
>
> "10. *Urges*:
>
> (*a*) All States to report to the Secretary-General, in a concise and expeditious manner and in accordance with the guidelines prepared by the Secretary-General, serious violations of the protection, security and safety of diplomatic and consular missions and representatives as well as missions and representatives with diplomatic status to international intergovernmental organizations;
>
> (*b*) The State in which the violation took place — and, to the extent possible, the State where the alleged offender is present — to report to the Secretary-General, in a concise and expeditious manner and in accordance with the guidelines prepared by the Secretary-General, on measures taken to bring the offender to justice and eventually to communicate, in accordance with its laws, the final outcome of the proceedings against the offender, and to report on measures adopted with a view to preventing a repetition of such violations;
>
> ...
>
> "12. *Also requests* the Secretary-General to invite States, in the circular note referred to in paragraph 11 (a) above, to inform him of their views with respect to any measures needed or already taken to enhance the protection, security and safety of diplomatic and consular missions and representatives as well as missions and representatives with diplomatic status to international intergovernmental organizations;
>
> "13. *Further requests* the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its seventy-first session a report containing:
>
> (*a*) Information on the state of ratification of and accessions to the instruments referred to in paragraph 8 above;
>
> (*b*) A summary of the reports received and views expressed pursuant to paragraphs 10 and 12 above".

2. By notes dated 21 January 2015 and 14 March 2016, the Secretary-General drew the attention of States to the request contained in paragraph 10 (a) of resolution 69/121 and invited them to report to the Secretary-General serious violations of the protection, security and safety of diplomatic and consular missions and representatives.

3. The present report has been prepared pursuant to paragraph 13 of resolution 69/121.

4. Section II of the report contains a summary of the reports received and the text of those reports relevant to paragraph 10 of the resolution.

5. Section III of the report contains the views expressed pursuant to paragraph 12 of the resolution.

6. Section IV of the report contains information on the status of participation of States, as at 11 July 2016, in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961,[1] the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 1963,[2] and the respective optional protocols thereto, as well as the 1973 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents.[3]

II. Reports received from States pursuant to paragraph 10 of General Assembly resolution 69/121

7. The **Islamic Republic of Iran** (23 April 2015) reported an incident in the city of Sana'a (20 April 2015):

> On 20 April 2015, in the city of Sana'a, Yemen, an air strike conducted by the coalition led by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia hit targets in the vicinity of the embassy of the Islamic Republic of Iran, resulting in damage to the building and property of the embassy. Iran deems it necessary to warn against any targeting of diplomatic premises and representatives, which is in flagrant violation of international law. Iran also recalls the international responsibility of those in charge of such reckless acts of military operation against diplomatic targets. It also demands that such acts against its diplomatic premises and representatives in Yemen do not reoccur.[4]

8. The **Islamic Republic of Iran** (24 April 2015) further reported an incident involving the official residence of the ambassador of the Islamic Republic of Iran to Libya (22 February 2015):

> On 22 February 2015, in the city of Tripoli, Libya, an explosion went off in front of the official residence of the ambassador of the Islamic Republic of Iran resulting in physical damage to the building and property of the residence. The ambassador was not in Libya at the time of the bombing. The local police authorities were duly informed and they were present on the scene to protect the area from further attacks. Later that day, a terrorist group affiliated to Daesh in Libya claimed responsibility for the attack. The embassy has been in touch with Libyan authorities to ensure that such attacks against its diplomatic premises would not reoccur.

9. The **United Arab Emirates** (27 August 2015) reported an incident that involved the Embassy of the United Arab Emirates in Sana'a (16 August 2015):

> On 16 August 2015, at 3 p.m., an armed contingent of Ansar Allah (the Houthis), led by a member of the Sana'a Police Force named Abdul Hamid

[1] United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 500, No. 7310.
[2] Ibid., vol. 596, No. 8638.
[3] Ibid., vol. 1035, No. 15410.
[4] A/69/884.

Al-Ansi, stormed the main gate of the Embassy of the United Arab Emirates compound in Sana'a. The armed contingent seized and occupied the compound, which contains the Embassy's main building as well as the residence of the Ambassador. Embassy staff members and security guards were ordered to leave the grounds, and Embassy-owned vehicles were moved by some members of the armed contingent to an undisclosed location. At present, the armed contingent is still occupying the Embassy compound in Sana'a.

The Government of the United Arab Emirates and the League of Arab States have strongly condemned this attack, which constitutes a flagrant violation of both customary and conventional international law as codified in the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and in the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. In this context, I would also like to recall that, as recently as 14 April 2015, the Security Council, in resolution 2216 (2015), reaffirmed the fundamental principle of the inviolability of diplomatic and consular premises along with the obligations of host Governments to take all appropriate steps to protect diplomatic and consular premises against any intrusion or damage, and to prevent any disturbance of the peace of those missions or impairment of their dignity. In this regard, we welcome the press statement issued by the President of the Security Council on 19 August 2015 that condemned the seizure of the Embassy and demanded an immediate withdrawal of all Houthi elements from the premises.[5]

10. The **Islamic Republic of Iran** (4 January 2016) reported incidents involving the premises of the Consulate General and the Embassy of Saudi Arabia in Mashad and Tehran, respectively (2 January 2016):

On Saturday, 2 January 2016 a large group of people gathered in front of the Saudi Arabian Consulate-General in Mashad in protest against the unjustified and provocative execution of the high-ranking spiritual leader, Ayatollah Sheikh Bagher Nimr Al-Nimr, arrested in 2012 in Saudi Arabia following his efforts to advance democracy and freedom of speech, and beheaded by sword on 2 January 2016. Necessary measures, including the increase in the number of security forces, were taken to prevent any assault against the premises of the Consulate. Unfortunately, however, the objects hurled by a number of the protesters hit the glass windows of the premises.

At the same date, numerous protesters (around 8,000) staged a peaceful demonstration in front of the Saudi Arabian Embassy in Tehran following the announcement of the execution of Sheikh Nimr. Some of the protesters got unfortunately out of control at around 11 p.m., and despite the extensive efforts made by the law enforcement authorities, some of them managed to enter the Embassy and inflict some damage on the building.

Upon arrival of police reinforcements, the protesters left the Embassy. More than 40 protesters were identified, arrested and handed over to the judicial authorities. An investigation is underway seeking to find other possible perpetrators.

While emphasizing its obligations in accordance with international law and relevant international instruments, especially the Vienna Convention on

[5] A/69/1019.

Diplomatic Relations of 1961 and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 1963, the Islamic Republic of Iran expresses its regret over the referred-to incidents and will spare no efforts in arresting and prosecuting all those who brought them about. The President of the Islamic Republic of Iran in his message stressed the need to pursue the issue and bring the elements behind the incidents to justice and provided necessary directions to the relevant government agencies, including the Ministry of Interior. The Chief of the Judiciary also reiterated the need to pursue this case in all its aspects.

The Islamic Republic of Iran will adopt necessary measures to prevent the occurrence of similar incidents in the future.[6]

11. **Serbia** (16 May 2016) reported a number of incidents involving the staff of Serbian embassies and/or their dependents:

In keeping with the provisions of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations consistently, the Republic of Serbia calls upon all United Nations Member States to comply with their obligation to protect diplomatic and consular missions and representatives and expects that the cases of violence against the missions and representatives will be addressed within a reasonable period of time.

Set out below are the incidents in which Serbian diplomatic and consular representatives have been involved:

Two members of the staff of the Embassy of Serbia in Tripoli, Ms. Sladana Stanković, Administrative Attaché, and Mr. Jovica Stephić, driver, were abducted by unidentified persons at Sabratah, Libya, on 8 November 2015 at about 2.15 p.m. local time. The abduction took place on a motorway as they drove in a motorcade of three automobiles towards the country's border with Tunisia. One of the automobiles ferried the Ambassador of the Republic of Serbia to Libya and his family; it was shot at during the raid and the security escort of the Ambassador, a Libyan national, was hit in the leg and wounded. No official report has been provided by the Libyan security services, so full details regarding the perpetrators and their accomplices are unavailable. Serbia expects that the investigation of the abduction will continue until full light has been shed on all its aspects. In February 2016, Ms. Stanković and Mr. Stephić were killed in an air raid on a camp in which they had been held. The relevant Serbian agencies are working with their United States partners to clarify the circumstances of the deaths.

- An assault was carried out on the Embassy of Serbia in Copenhagen on 12 July 2015 during which bricks and red paint were thrown. The incident was reported to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, and the perpetrators have been found; they have not been processed, however, "due to the lack of evidence", according to the Danish authorities.

- A Serbian diplomat was attacked and robbed in Paris on 3 March 2016. The incident was reported to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of France and is being investigated by the competent French authorities.

[6] A/70/650.

- An underage dependent of a member of the staff of the Embassy of Serbia in Paris was attacked and robbed on 10 February 2016. The incident was reported to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of France and is being investigated by the competent French authorities.
- Members of the staff of the Embassy of Serbia in Paris were attacked and robbed on 3 October 2015. The incident was reported to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of France and is being investigated by the competent French authorities.
- A dependent of a Serbian diplomat was attacked in Chicago, United States, on 26 March 2016. The incident was reported to the competent United States authorities who are investigating it.

12. **Belgium** (24 June 2016) reported on a number of incidents, referred to the Protocol Directorate of Foreign Affairs, that targeted foreign diplomatic missions in Belgium:

Country	*Institution*	*Incidents*	*Date*
Turkey	Residence of the Ambassador	Acts of vandalism	10 April 2016
Turkey	Consulate General (Antwerp)	Intrusion into the garden during the night	2 April 2016
Niger	Embassy building	Theft of the national flag during the night	16 March 2016
Saudi Arabia	Embassy building	Threats and suspicious behaviour of an individual	January 2016
Hungary	Embassy building	Acts of vandalism (defacing of the embassy nameplates)	17 October 2015
Mauritania	Embassy building	Acts of vandalism (graffiti)	5 October 2015
Islamic Republic of Iran	Embassy building	Acts of vandalism (damage to equipment)	Early 2015
Jamaica	Residence of the Ambassador	Burglary	6 December 2014
Islamic Republic of Iran	Embassy building	Acts of vandalism (throwing of stones, graffiti)	September-October 2014
Greece	Embassy building	Acts of vandalism (graffiti)	2 September 2014
Morocco	Embassy building	Acts of vandalism (graffiti)	19 August 2014

Country	*Institution*	*Incidents*	*Date*
Peru	Embassy building	Theft of the embassy's copper nameplates	8 July 2014
Germany	Permanent Representation to the European Union	Acts of vandalism	25 June 2014
Brunei Darussalam	Embassy building	Burglary	9 May 2014
Malawi	Embassy building	Theft of the national flag	3 February 2014

Each incident and the measures taken by the Belgian authorities are outlined below.

Early in 2016, the following incidents were reported:

- *10 April 2016, Turkey: acts of vandalism against the residence of the Ambassador*. These acts were committed by protesters during a protest that was not directed at the residence itself. An inquiry was opened by the police. The Crisis Centre of the Federal Public Service for Internal Affairs was informed and offered to reimburse the Embassy of Turkey for the costs of cleaning the facade. During protests taking place in the vicinity of the residence, appropriate security measures will be taken for the residence, even if it is not targeted by the protest.

- *Night of 2-3 April 2016, Turkey: intrusion into the garden of the Consulate General in Antwerp*. The police intervened and caught the intruder. The intruder claimed to have the wrong address and to have been invited. The Crisis Centre was notified to ensure that police patrols were informed of the incident and appropriate measures taken.

- *Night of 16-17 March 2016, Niger: theft of the national flag of the embassy*. The Crisis Centre was notified to ensure that police patrols were informed of the incident and appropriate measures taken.

- *January 2016, Saudi Arabia: threats and suspicious behaviour of an anonymous individual at the embassy*. The threat was assessed by the Coordinating Body for Threat Analysis. Given that the level of threat to the embassy was already at level 3, police patrols were made aware of the threats and the suspicious behaviour of the individual in question.

In 2015, the following incidents were reported:

- *17 October 2015, Hungary: act of vandalism (defacing of the embassy nameplates)*. The police prepared a written report and the Crisis Centre was notified to ensure that police patrols were informed of the incident and appropriate measures taken.

- *5 October 2015, Mauritania: act of vandalism (graffiti on the embassy entrance and garage).* The police conducted an inquiry and the Crisis Centre was contacted to ensure that appropriate security measures were taken.

- *Early 2015, Islamic Republic of Iran: acts of vandalism against the embassy.* The videophone and doorbell were broken. The Protocol Directorate offered to reimburse the costs of purchasing new security equipment to replace the equipment that had been destroyed. The police prepared a written report and the Crisis Centre was notified to ensure that appropriate security measures were taken.

In 2014, the following incidents were reported:

- *6 December 2014, Jamaica: burglary at the residence of the ambassador.* The police came to the scene and prepared a written report. An inquiry was conducted. The Crisis Centre was notified to ensure that appropriate security measures were taken.

- *September-October 2014, Islamic Republic of Iran: acts of vandalism against the embassy (throwing of stones and a large amount of graffiti on the facade).* The Crisis Centre was notified to ensure that appropriate security measures were taken and the police conducted an inquiry following the filing of complaints by the embassy.

- *2 September 2014, Greece: acts of vandalism (graffiti on the facade of the embassy building).* The Crisis Centre was notified to ensure that police patrols were informed of the issue and appropriate security measures taken.

- *19 August 2014, Morocco: acts of vandalism (graffiti on the facade of the embassy building).* The Crisis Centre was notified to ensure that police patrols were informed of the issue and appropriate security measures taken.

- *8 July 2014, Peru: theft of the embassy's copper nameplates.* The nameplates were on the front of the embassy building. An inquiry was opened by the police. The Crisis Centre was contacted by the Protocol Directorate.

- *25 June 2014, Germany: acts of vandalism on the facade of the Permanent Representation to the European Union during a protest.* The Crisis Centre was notified to ensure that police patrols were informed of the issue and appropriate security measures taken.

- *9 May 2014, Brunei Darussalam: burglary at the embassy building.* The police came to the scene and prepared a written report. An inquiry was conducted and the Crisis Centre was notified to ensure that appropriate security measures were taken.

- *3 February 2014, Malawi: theft of the national flag.* The Crisis Centre was notified to ensure that police patrols were informed of the issue and appropriate security measures taken.

13. **Finland** (13 May 2016) and **Lebanon** (19 May 2016) reported that there had been no violations on their respective territories during the reporting period.

III. Views expressed by States pursuant to paragraph 12 of General Assembly resolution 69/121

14. **Qatar** (9 March 2015) expressed the following views:

The State of Qatar has always strived assiduously to abide by, implement and enforce all principles of international law governing diplomatic and consular relations, whether customary or codified.

Since 1986, Qatar has been a party to the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. It also became a party in 1998 to the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. In 1997, Qatar acceded to the 1973 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents.

Moreover, with respect to the implementation of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, which provides that it is the duty of all persons enjoying such privileges and immunities to respect the laws and regulations of the receiving State, article 21 of Decree-Law No. 13 (2009) regarding the diplomatic and consular service stresses that the members of the Qatari diplomatic and consular service must uphold the dignity, honour and good name of their profession, whether in the workplace or outside it, and must avoid all that may damage international relations with other countries.

15. **El Salvador** (11 May 2016) expressed the following views:

El Salvador, as a State party to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, attaches particular importance to article 22, paragraph 2, which establishes the obligation of the receiving State "to take all appropriate steps to protect the premises of the mission against any intrusion or damage and to prevent any disturbance of the peace of the mission or impairment of its dignity". Pursuant to that provision, effective mechanisms have been created to improve the protection and security of diplomatic and consular missions and representatives.

On an internal level, it is possible for any diplomatic mission or international organization and its respective officials to make a request to the Directorate-General of Protocol and Honours of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to take any necessary steps to provide them with protection.

The Directorate-General is responsible for officially notifying the National Civil Police, specifically its Very-Important-Person Protection Division, which has the capability to meet the requirements and offer the requested level of protection. Such missions and officials may also opt to request ongoing protection from the Division if deemed necessary.

Records show that, during the past year, the Directorate-General has fulfilled all the requests submitted and has provided the security and protection measures requested by the national authorities. In addition, the National Civil Police has been made aware of all situations where diplomats, their premises and international organizations have been the targets of crime, so that a proper investigation can be launched and legal proceedings undertaken.

16. **Finland** (13 May 2016) expressed the following views:

The Finnish authorities wish to assure the Secretary-General that they continue to take all appropriate measures to ensure the protection, security and safety of diplomatic and consular missions and representatives. Furthermore, Finland wishes to emphasize the importance of close cooperation in security matters not only at the international level, but also nationally between the missions and the competent local authorities.

17. **Belgium** (24 June 2016) expressed the following views:

(a) General measures

Security measures for diplomatic missions are determined according to the threat analysis by the Coordinating Body for Threat Analysis. That body ascertains the threat level to each diplomatic mission in Belgium. Based on the threat level, the Crisis Centre of the Federal Public Service for Internal Affairs can require the police services to take specific security measures appropriate to each mission. The Crisis Centre organizes a monthly meeting, in which the Protocol Directorate of Foreign Affairs participates, for general follow-up on the security measures for different diplomatic missions in Belgium.

(b) Specific measures

Diplomatic missions that have a security issue communicate it to the Protocol Directorate of Foreign Affairs. Each specific issue is then reported by the Protocol Directorate to the competent security service and receives an appropriate response.

IV. Status of participation in international conventions pertaining to the protection, security and safety of diplomatic and consular missions and representatives as at 11 July 2016

18. Each instrument listed below is represented in tables 1 and 2 by the letter shown on the left in the list.

A. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961 (signed at Vienna on 18 April 1961; entered into force on 24 April 1964, in accordance with article 51);

B. Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations concerning Acquisition of Nationality of 1961 (signed at Vienna on 18 April 1961; entered into force on 24 April 1964, in accordance with article VI);

C. Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes of 1961 (signed at Vienna on 18 April 1961; entered into force on 24 April 1964);

D. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 1963 (signed at Vienna on 24 April 1963; entered into force on 19 March 1967, in accordance with article 77);

E. Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations concerning Acquisition of Nationality of 1963 (signed at Vienna on 24 April 1963; entered into force on 19 March 1967);

F. Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes of 1963 (signed at Vienna on 24 April 1963; entered into force on 19 March 1967);

G. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, of 1973 (adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 14 December 1973; entered into force on 20 February 1977).

Table 1
Total participation in international conventions pertaining to the protection, security and safety of diplomatic and consular missions and representatives

Signature, succession to signature						
A	B	C	D	E	F	G
60	18	29	48	19	38	25

Ratification, accession or succession						
A	B	C	D	E	F	G
190	51	70	179	40	51	178

Table 2
Status of participation in international conventions pertaining to the protection, security and safety of diplomatic and consular missions and representatives

	Signature, succession to signature							*Ratification, accession or succession*						
State	*A*	*B*	*C*	*D*	*E*	*F*	*G*	*A*	*B*	*C*	*D*	*E*	*F*	*G*
Afghanistan								A						G
Albania	A							A			D			G
Algeria								A			D			G
Andorra								A			D			G
Angola								A			D			
Antigua and Barbuda											D			G
Argentina	A	B		D		F		A	B		D			G
Armenia								A			D			G
Australia	A			D			G	A		C	D		F	G

State	Signature, succession to signature							Ratification, accession or succession						
	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Austria	A		C	D		F		A		C	D		F	G
Azerbaijan								A			D			G
Bahamas								A		C	D			G
Bahrain								A			D			G
Bangladesh								A			D			G
Barbados								A			D			G
Belarus	A						G	A			D			G
Belgium	A		C	D		F		A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Belize								A			D			G
Benin				D		F		A			D			G
Bhutan								A			D			G
Bolivia (Plurinational State of)				D				A			D			G
Bosnia and Herzegovina					E	F		A	B	C	D			G
Botswana								A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Brazil	A			D	E			A			D			G
Brunei Darussalam								A			D			G
Bulgaria	A						G	A		C	D	E	F	G
Burkina Faso				D		F		A			D		F	G
Burundi								A						G
Cambodia								A	B	C	D			G
Cameroon				D	E	F		A			D			G
Canada	A						G	A			D			G
Cabo Verde								A			D			G
Central African Republic	A	B	C	D		F		A	B	C				G
Chad								A						
Chile	A			D		F		A			D			G
China								A			D			G

State	Signature, succession to signature							Ratification, accession or succession						
	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Colombia	A		C	D	E	F		A			D			G
Comoros								A						G
Congo				D	E	F		A						
Cook Islands														
Costa Rica	A			D				A		C	D			G
Côte d'Ivoire				D		F		A						G
Croatia								A			D			G
Cuba	A			D				A			D			G
Cyprus								A			D			G
Czech Republic								A			D			G
Democratic People's Republic of Korea								A			D			G
Democratic Republic of the Congo	A			D	E	F		A	B	C	D			G
Denmark	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Djibouti								A			D			G
Dominica								A		C	D			G
Dominican Republic	A	B	C	D	E	F		A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Ecuador	A		C	D			G	A		C	D			G
Egypt								A	B		D	E		G
El Salvador								A			D			G
Equatorial Guinea								A		C	D			G
Eritrea								A			D			
Estonia								A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Ethiopia								A						G
Fiji								A		C	D			G
Finland	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
France	A		C	D		F		A		C	D		F	G
Gabon				D		F		A	B	C	D	E	F	G

State	Signature, succession to signature							Ratification, accession or succession						
	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Gambia								A			D			
Georgia								A			D			G
Germany	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Ghana	A	B	C	D	E	F		A			D	E		G
Greece	A							A			D			G
Grenada								A			D			G
Guatemala	A						G	A			D			G
Guinea								A	B	C	D			G
Guinea-Bissau								A						G
Guyana								A			D			G
Haiti								A			D			G
Holy See	A			D				A			D			G
Honduras								A			D			G
Hungary	A						G	A		C	D		F	G
Iceland							G	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
India								A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Indonesia								A	B		D	E		
Iran (Islamic Republic of)	A	B	C	D				A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Iraq	A	B	C					A	B	C	D	E		G
Ireland	A		C	D		F		A			D			G
Israel	A		C	D				A						G
Italy	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Jamaica								A			D			G
Japan	A		C					A		C	D		F	G
Jordan								A			D			G
Kazakhstan								A			D			G
Kenya								A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Kiribati								A			D			G

State	Signature, succession to signature							Ratification, accession or succession						
	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Kuwait				D	E	F		A		C	D			G
Kyrgyzstan								A			D			G
Lao People's Democratic Republic								A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Latvia								A			D			G
Lebanon	A	B	C	D		F		A			D			G
Lesotho								A			D			G
Liberia	A			D	E	F		A	B	C	D			G
Libya								A	B		D			G
Liechtenstein	A		C	D		F		A		C	D		F	G
Lithuania								A		C	D		F	G
Luxembourg	A		C	D		F		A		C	D		F	G
Madagascar								A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Malawi								A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Malaysia								A	B	C	D			G
Maldives								A			D			G
Mali								A			D			G
Malta								A		C	D			G
Marshall Islands								A			D			G
Mauritania								A			D			G
Mauritius								A		C	D		F	G
Mexico	A			D				A			D		F	G
Micronesia (Federated States of)								A			D			G
Monaco								A			D			G
Mongolia							G	A			D			G
Montenegro					E	F		A	B	C	D			G
Morocco								A	B		D	E		G
Mozambique								A			D			G

State	Signature, succession to signature							Ratification, accession or succession						
	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Myanmar								A	B		D			G
Namibia								A			D			
Nauru								A		C	D	E		G
Nepal								A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Netherlands								A	B	C	D	E	F	G
New Zealand	A		C					A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Nicaragua							G	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Niger				D		F		A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Nigeria	A							A			D			G
Niue														G
Norway	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Oman								A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Pakistan	A							A		C	D		F	G
Palau														G
Panama	A			D	E	F		A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Papua New Guinea								A			D			G
Paraguay							G	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Peru				D		F		A			D		F	G
Philippines	A	B	C	D		F		A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Poland	A			D			G	A			D			G
Portugal								A			D			G
Qatar								A			D			G
Republic of Korea	A	B	C					A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Republic of Moldova								A			D			G
Romania	A						G	A		C	D		F	G
Russian Federation	A						G	A			D			G
Rwanda							G	A			D			G
Saint Kitts and Nevis								A			D			G

State	Signature, succession to signature							Ratification, accession or succession						
	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Saint Lucia								A			D			G
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines								A			D			G
Samoa								A			D			
San Marino	A							A						G
Sao Tome and Principe								A			D			G
Saudi Arabia								A			D			G
Senegal	A	B						A			D	E	F	G
Serbia					E	F		A	B	C	D			G
Seychelles								A		C	D		F	G
Sierra Leone								A			D			G
Singapore								A			D			G
Slovakia								A		C	D		F	G
Slovenia								A		C	D			G
Solomon Islands														
Somalia								A			D			
South Africa	A							A			D			G
South Sudan														
Spain								A		C	D		F	G
Sri Lanka	A							A	B	C	D			G
State of Palestine								A			D			G
Sudan								A			D			G
Suriname								A	B	C	D	E	F	
Swaziland								A						G
Sweden	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Switzerland	A		C	D		F		A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Syrian Arab Republic								A			D			G
Tajikistan								A			D			G

State	Signature, succession to signature							Ratification, accession or succession						
	A	*B*	*C*	*D*	*E*	*F*	*G*	*A*	*B*	*C*	*D*	*E*	*F*	*G*
Thailand	A	B						A	B		D	E		G
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia								A	B	C	D			G
Timor-Leste								A			D			
Togo								A			D			G
Tonga								A			D			G
Trinidad and Tobago								A			D			G
Tunisia							G	A	B		D	E		G
Turkey								A			D			G
Turkmenistan								A			D			G
Tuvalu								A			D			
Uganda								A						G
Ukraine	A						G	A			D			G
United Arab Emirates								A			D			G
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	A		C	D		F	G	A		C	D		F	G
United Republic of Tanzania	A	B	C					A	B	C	D			
United States of America	A		C	D			G	A		C	D			G
Uruguay	A			D		F		A			D			G
Uzbekistan								A			D			G
Vanuatu											D			
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)	A			D				A			D			G
Viet Nam								A			D		F	G
Yemen								A			D			G
Zambia								A			D			
Zimbabwe								A			D			

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Seventy-first session
Item 97 (ll) of the preliminary list*
General and complete disarmament

Follow-up to the 2013 high-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament

Report of the Secretary-General

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* A/71/50.

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I. Introduction

1. The General Assembly, in its resolution 70/34, entitled "Follow-up to the 2013 high-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament", adopted on 7 December 2015, underlined the strong support, expressed at the high-level meeting of the Assembly on nuclear disarmament, held on 26 September 2013, for taking urgent and effective measures to achieve the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

2. The General Assembly called for urgent compliance with the legal obligations and the fulfilment of the commitments undertaken on nuclear disarmament and endorsed the wide support expressed at the high-level meeting for a comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons.

3. The General Assembly also called for the urgent commencement of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament for the early conclusion of a comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons to prohibit their possession, development, production, acquisition, testing, stockpiling, transfer, use or threat of use and to provide for their destruction.

4. The General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to seek the views of Member States with regard to achieving the objective of the total elimination of nuclear weapons, in particular on the elements of a comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons, and to submit a report thereon to the Assembly at its seventy-first session, and to transmit the report to the Conference on Disarmament.

5. By a note verbale dated 11 February 2016, Member States were invited to communicate their views on the issues. The replies received are contained in section II of the present report.

II. Replies received from Governments

Argentina

[Original: Spanish]
[1 June 2016]

The total elimination of nuclear weapons is an essential component of Argentina's position on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the disarmament agenda in general.

Argentina believes that the total elimination of weapons of mass destruction should be the central priority of the international community. The repercussions of such weapons go beyond the area of disarmament as such, and have a grave impact on international peace and security.

Argentina is also conscious of the momentous humanitarian consequences of one type of such weapons of mass destruction, in addition to their destabilizing effect on international security.

The case of nuclear weapons is perhaps the most serious. Although their use and the threat thereof constitute a crime against humanity and a violation of international law, they have yet to be banned.

There is therefore a need to reflect on the Treaty and its role in the international security framework. Argentina views the Non-Proliferation Treaty as a security treaty.

Within the framework of the Treaty, non-nuclear-weapon States undertook not to acquire or develop such weapons, while nuclear-weapon States undertook to negotiate their elimination. And yet, decades later, the progress made in non-proliferation has yet to be matched in the area of nuclear disarmament.

That situation is particularly serious given that, by failing to fulfil their commitments under the Treaty, the nuclear-weapon States introduced an element of inequity to the balance of security underpinned by the Treaty. In so doing, they provided an argument for those who call into question the credibility of the non-proliferation regime.

Nuclear-weapon States have proved persistent, as have those other States that benefit indirectly from the protection that nuclear weapons supposedly provide. The result can only be to make international peace and security more unbalanced and unstable.

Argentina therefore supports the efforts of the international community to move towards the negotiation of a legally binding universal instrument banning nuclear weapons.

In the same vein, we stand by the international process aimed at drawing attention to the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons.

Action towards comprehensive and verifiable nuclear disarmament should not be further delayed.

The only guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is their total elimination.

Chile

[Original: Spanish]
[19 May 2016]

Our country has an unwavering commitment to achieving disarmament and non-proliferation, strengthening human rights and international humanitarian law and seeking synergies among these areas of the multilateral system. In this context, Chile has embraced the paradigm of human security, which guides our multilateral efforts by placing individuals and communities at the centre of its collective activities. We are therefore promoting the establishment of new bodies for the discussion and analysis of this approach in order to achieve nuclear disarmament.

Chile has systematically defended its policy and genuine commitment to all of the obligations contained in article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In that context, we have condemned the lack of progress in the balanced implementation of that provision and we advocate the adoption of a treaty banning nuclear weapons. We are convinced that the most appropriate way to make substantial progress towards nuclear disarmament is in fact through the adoption of a binding, verifiable and universal instrument prohibiting nuclear weapons.

Accordingly, our country has supported all negotiations aimed at the conclusion of a comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons, since these are the only weapons of mass destruction not yet prohibited by an international treaty. Chile will therefore continue to support and speak out in favour of the efforts of the Open-ended Working Group currently in session in Geneva. We hope that their work will help to start the discussion on a legally binding instrument banning nuclear weapons.

At the regional level, Chile has supported the various special declarations on the commitment to take forward the multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations delivered at the summits of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States, where reference has been made to the urgent need to adopt a comprehensive convention providing for the prohibition and complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

Colombia

[Original: Spanish]
[18 April 2016]

With reference to operative paragraph 14 of the resolution, which reads:

> Requests the Secretary-General to seek the views of Member States with regard to achieving the objective of the total elimination of nuclear weapons, in particular on the elements of a comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons, and to submit a report thereon to the General Assembly at its seventy-first session, and also to transmit the report to the Conference on Disarmament,

Colombia states the following:

- Colombia fully complies with the provisions of the main international instruments on nuclear disarmament, recognizes the established international institutions and is firmly committed to the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. These are the foundations of its foreign policy.
- Colombia plays an active role in the international forums that address global issues, such as the 2013 high-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament, by drafting and adopting initiatives to free the world of the threat of nuclear weapons.
- Colombia believes that it is important to establish mechanisms to complement the Conference on Disarmament, the Disarmament Commission and the Open-ended Working Group to develop proposals to take forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations for the achievement and maintenance of a world without nuclear weapons. Colombia continues to work in those forums towards nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.
- As a party to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which led to the establishment of the first nuclear-weapon-free zone in a densely populated area, Colombia calls for the establishment of new nuclear-weapon-free zones, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned, to strengthen the international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime.

- Colombia firmly believes that bans on nuclear weapons (non-proliferation) and the elimination of nuclear weapons (disarmament) must be closely connected, and that such measures must be implemented in conjunction with each other.

Cuba

[Original: Spanish]
[29 June 2016]

Cuba is fully committed to nuclear disarmament, which is the highest priority in the area of disarmament. The only way to ensure that humanity will never again suffer the terrible impact of nuclear weapons is their prohibition and total elimination in a transparent and irreversible manner.

Despite the extremely high level of international support for the prohibition and total elimination of nuclear weapons, little progress has been made towards achieving that goal. The full implementation of General Assembly resolutions 68/32, 69/58 and 70/34 on the follow-up to the 2013 high-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament is of great importance.

Multilateralism and multilaterally agreed solutions, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, provide the only sustainable method of addressing disarmament and international security issues.

Cuba proposes the following practical actions to further the objective of nuclear disarmament:

(a) Immediate establishment of a special committee on nuclear disarmament, with a negotiating mandate, within the Conference on Disarmament;

(b) Steady progress on a reduction in the global stockpile of all types of nuclear weapons;

(c) Cessation by nuclear-weapon States of the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons, their delivery systems and related infrastructure;

(d) Immediate and permanent cessation of nuclear testing of any kind, including simulations and subcritical tests, and closure of all nuclear weapon test sites;

(e) Effective and urgent implementation of article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, wherein the parties undertake to pursue negotiations with a view to the adoption of effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament;

(f) Application of the principles of transparency and irreversibility by nuclear-weapon States in all measures related to the fulfilment of their nuclear disarmament obligations;

(g) Elimination of the role of nuclear weapons in military and security doctrines;

(h) Progressive reduction of the operational status of nuclear weapons systems until they are totally eliminated;

(i) Withdrawal by the nuclear powers of all reservations and interpretative declarations to protocols to treaties establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones, which conflict with the nuclear-free status of those zones;

(j) Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East;

(k) Urgent adoption of a treaty providing universal, unconditional and legally binding security guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon States;

(l) Adoption of a non-discriminatory, multilateral and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, which takes account of current stocks of fissile material, as a step towards the primary objective of nuclear disarmament;

(m) Establishment of a mechanism for the verification of the elimination of nuclear weapons;

(n) Initiation of negotiations on a programme to gradually eliminate all nuclear weapons, including the negotiation of a universal and legally binding instrument prohibiting the development, production, acquisition, testing, stockpiling, transfer, use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and providing for their verified destruction within a fixed time frame.

Cuba will continue to work alongside the rest of the international community to ensure that the measures and actions to be taken to eliminate nuclear weapons in the shortest possible time can be identified at the high-level international conference on nuclear disarmament to be held, by decision of the General Assembly, no later than in 2018.

Cuba also welcomes the events that have taken place around the world to mark the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, celebrated annually on 26 September, and urges Governments, parliaments and civil society to take further steps every year to mark the day and mobilize international action in order to achieve the common goal of a world free of nuclear weapons.

India

[Original: English]
[31 May 2016]

India supported General Assembly resolution 70/34, submitted by the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, in which the Assembly called for the Conference on Disarmament to commence negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear weapons convention.

India is convinced that the goal of nuclear disarmament can be achieved through a step-by-step process underwritten by a universal commitment and an agreed multilateral framework that is global and non-discriminatory. There is need for a meaningful dialogue among all States possessing nuclear weapons to build trust and confidence and to reduce the salience of nuclear weapons in international affairs and security doctrines.

In its working paper CD/1816, India enumerated specific steps, including reaffirmation of the unequivocal commitment of all nuclear-weapon States to the

goal of complete elimination of nuclear weapons; reduction of the salience of nuclear weapons in the security doctrines; measures by nuclear-weapon States to reduce nuclear danger; negotiation of a global agreement among nuclear weapon States on "no-first-use" of nuclear-weapons; negotiation of a universal and legally binding agreement on non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States; negotiation of a convention on the complete prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; and negotiation of a nuclear weapons convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons and on their destruction, leading to the global, non-discriminatory and verifiable elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified time frame.

India considers the Conference on Disarmament as the appropriate forum for the commencement of negotiations on nuclear disarmament through the establishment of a subsidiary body with a mandate agreed by consensus as part of a comprehensive and balanced programme of work.

India joined the statements made in the Conference on Disarmament on behalf of G-21 in March and September 2014, March, June and August 2015 and March and May 2016, calling for urgent commencement of negotiations on nuclear disarmament in the Conference on Disarmament, in particular on a comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons to prohibit their possession, development, production, acquisition, testing, stockpiling, transfer, use or threat of use and to provide for their destruction.

Iran (Islamic Republic of)

[Original: English]
[17 June 2016]

In the view of the Islamic Republic of Iran, there is no absolute guarantee against the threat or use of nuclear weapons other than their total elimination. Nuclear disarmament is an obligation that cannot be replaced by nuclear weapon reductions and the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, or by any other arrangement or mechanism short of the total, irreversible and internationally verifiable elimination of all nuclear weapons globally, in accordance with a universal, legally binding instrument that also ensures that they will never be produced again.

As unanimously concluded by the International Court of Justice in its advisory opinion of 8 July 1996, taking all necessary practical measures for the total elimination of all nuclear weapons worldwide, including to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control, is a legal obligation to which all States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) are committed under its article VI. It is imperative that the obligations under article VI, the accomplishment of which is neither conditional nor optional, be urgently fulfilled in order to remove the threat posed to humanity by the continued existence of nuclear weapons and to prevent the further frustration of the non-nuclear-weapon States and the consistent erosion of the validity, effectiveness and credibility of NPT.

While stressing the need to preserve the momentum on nuclear disarmament created, in part, by the first-ever high-level meeting of the General Assembly on

nuclear disarmament, held on 26 September 2013, and the three Conferences on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons, held in 2013 and 2014, Iran underlines the importance of the urgent and full implementation of the provisions of Assembly resolution 68/32, by which the Assembly, among other things, called for the urgent commencement of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament for the early conclusion of a comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons to prohibit their possession, development, production, acquisition, testing, stockpiling, transfer, use or threat of use and to provide for their destruction. Iran strongly holds that such a comprehensive convention is the only practical way to achieve the objective of the total elimination of nuclear weapons and can, in no way, be replaced by unilateral or bilateral initiatives or other similar arrangements.

While reiterating its support for the urgent commencement of negotiations for the early conclusion of a comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons, Iran is of the view that such a convention, as a universal, non-discriminatory, legally binding instrument, inter alia, should:

- Prohibit forever, without exception and under any circumstances, research on and the development, testing, production, possession, acquisition, transfer, stockpiling and use or threat of use, of all types of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices worldwide;
- Set, within a phased programme, a clear and unextendable deadline for the total elimination of all types of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices worldwide;
- Prohibit forever, without exception and under any circumstances, research on and the production, possession, acquisition, transfer and stockpiling of any amount of fissile materials for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices worldwide;
- Set, within a phased programme, a clear and unextendable deadline for the total elimination or the conversion to materials usable exclusively for peaceful purposes of all existing fissile materials for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices worldwide;
- Prohibit forever, without exception and under any circumstances, the planning for, or the construction of, any installation or facility relating to research on, and the production of, any type of nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device worldwide;
- Set, within a phased programme, a clear and unextendable deadline for the total destruction of all the installations or facilities relating to research on, and the production of, any type of nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device worldwide;
- Prohibit forever, without exception and under any circumstances, any kind of direct or indirect cooperation in, or assistance to, or encouragement or inducement of, any activity prohibited under the convention or incompatible, in any way, with its object and purpose;
- Confirm, explicitly, that its main objective is to ensure that, under any circumstances, there is no type of nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device, no fissile materials for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, no installation or facility relating to research on, or the

production of, any type of nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device or any activity prohibited under the convention or incompatible, in any way, with its object and purpose worldwide;

- Establish a robust international verification mechanism to ensure the total absence of any type of nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device, any amount of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, any installation or facility relating to research on, or the production of, any type of nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device or any other activity prohibited under the convention or incompatible, in any way, with its object and purpose, and to ensure the sustainability of such a situation worldwide under all circumstances;

- Be of indefinite duration and enter into force after its ratification by all States possessing nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and installation or facility relating to research on, or the production of, any type of nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device or any other activity prohibited under the convention or incompatible, in any way, with its object and purpose.

Kazakhstan

[Original: English]
[1 June 2016]

Kazakhstan fully supports the idea of achieving the objective of the total elimination of nuclear weapons, in particular, formulating the elements of a comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons.

In our view, the greatest threats to peace are that of nuclear weapons and nuclear terrorism. At the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit, President Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan announced his "Manifesto: the world, the twenty-first century" of 31 March 2016. He warned world leaders about a possible apocalypse if heed was not paid to eliminate thousands of nuclear weapons in the context of a possible renewed and dangerous arms race. The manifesto has now become a document of both the General Assembly (A/70/818) and the Security Council (S/2016/317).

In 1991, as a newly independent State, Kazakhstan permanently closed the Semipalatinsk nuclear test site and voluntarily renounced the world's fourth largest arsenal of nuclear weapons. Our country is of the view that only gradual progress leads to a world free of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. Our experience and awareness of the devastation and suffering caused by over 450 nuclear tests from 1949 to 1989 lead us to accede to the Humanitarian Pledge initiated by Austria and to co-sponsor other General Assembly resolutions. We consider it to be our moral duty to be one of the leaders of the global process of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. We thus tabled Assembly resolution 70/57 on the Universal Declaration on the Achievement of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World, which was adopted by the Assembly on 7 December 2015. This document is an important step towards a comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons.

Twenty years ago, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty was put forward for Member States to sign, but it has yet to come into force.

There is an urgent necessity to adopt internationally binding agreements to ban the creation of new types of weapons of mass destruction through new technological advances. It is thus critical to create a United Nations registry of such scientific developments that could lead to the creation of weapons of mass destruction.

Mexico[1]

[Original: Spanish]
[2 June 2016]

Conscious of the devastating short- and long-term effects that an intentional or accidental nuclear detonation would have on the population and the environment at the regional and global levels, Mexico supports the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

In the First Committee during the seventieth session of the United Nations General Assembly, Mexico introduced, coordinated and facilitated the resolution entitled "Taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations",[2] which established an open-ended working group with the mandate to elaborate new legal norms and measures for nuclear disarmament that will meet in Geneva in 2016 (from 22 to 26 February; from 2 to 13 May, and during the week of 22 August 2016).

Mexico has indicated that while there can be no disarmament progress without the involvement of the nuclear countries, the working group should focus on what non-nuclear States can do: promote the development of new standards and prevent humanitarian catastrophes. Mexico submitted a working paper containing elements to prohibit nuclear weapons, as well as recommendations (A/AC.286/WP.17).

Together with Austria, Ireland, South Africa and the Holy See, since 2012 Mexico has promoted the Humanitarian Initiative on the Impact of Nuclear Weapons, which arose out of the frustration of non-nuclear States and civil society with the lack of progress in nuclear disarmament.

Mexico believes that an instrument on nuclear weapons should:

- Cover all nuclear weapons and ban their existence.
- Accept the definitions used by the International Atomic Energy Agency and those contained in the Treaty of Tlatelolco as the basis for all negotiations.
- Establish non-extendable deadlines for the destruction of all nuclear weapons.
- Ban and eliminate nuclear weapons irreversibly.
- Establish a verification agency.
- Enter into force upon signature and ratification by a set number of States, with no restrictive clauses.
- Be universally applicable and open to all States.

[1] The full text of the information provided by the Government of Mexico is available on the website of the Office for Disarmament Affairs. An executive summary was provided for inclusion in the present report.

[2] Sponsored by 29 countries: Austria, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Georgia, Ghana, Guatemala, Honduras, Ireland, Jamaica, Kenya, Liechtenstein, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mexico, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Palau, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, The Philippines, South Africa, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay and Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of).

Netherlands

[Original: English]
[1 June 2016]

At its seventieth session, the General Assembly adopted its resolution 70/34, entitled "Follow-up to the 2013 high-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament".

The Kingdom of the Netherlands herewith submits the view of the Government of the Netherlands on the issues covered by this resolution.

The Netherlands wishes to emphasize that it fully shares the ultimate goal of resolution 70/34, a world free of nuclear weapons. The Netherlands participated at the ministerial level in the high-level meeting on nuclear disarmament, held on 26 September 2013, during which various perspectives on how to best achieve a nuclear-weapon-free world were discussed.

The Netherlands notes with regret that resolution 70/34 reflects only one particular viewpoint, while various other proposals made during the 26 September 2013 meeting were not captured by it.

As stated in the explanation of vote that was read by the delegation of the Netherlands on behalf of a group of like-minded countries during the seventieth session of the General Assembly, the resolution includes no clear references to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), while the Netherlands would have very much preferred a broader reference to the NPT and an underlining of its pivotal importance to nuclear disarmament.

The Netherlands also stands by its questions raised on the international conference to be held in 2018. The Netherlands feels that the importance of international efforts on nuclear disarmament is insufficiently emphasized by processes that are, in scope and intention, insufficiently clear and transparent. This will prevent key States from participating and is detrimental to the international trust on which successful disarmament is based. Instead, we should focus our efforts on making progress in the context of NPT.

The Netherlands further regrets that, by focusing on one core element of the work of the Conference on Disarmament, the resolution does not do justice to the urgent attention that needs to be paid to the adoption of a comprehensive and balanced programme of work of the Conference and the other core issues. The Netherlands also believes that starting negotiations on a nuclear weapons convention without the participation of the States that possess nuclear weapons will not advance the overall goal of nuclear disarmament.

Members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries

[Original: English]
[23 June 2016]

The Movement of Non-Aligned Countries stresses that nuclear disarmament continues to be the highest priority and that the ultimate goal of nuclear disarmament is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. In this regard, it calls upon all States to continue to accord the highest priority to nuclear disarmament leading to the total elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified framework of

time and under strict and effective international control. In the task of achieving the goals of nuclear disarmament, all the nuclear-weapon States, in particular those that possess the largest nuclear arsenals, bear a special responsibility. In this context, the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries calls upon the five nuclear-weapon States:

(a) To fully comply with their overdue obligations under the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;

(b) Not to transfer to any recipient nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices, and not to encourage or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or acquire them or control over them;

(c) To cease any efforts to upgrade nuclear weapons or carry out research on, and develop, new types of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and their means of delivery;

(d) To exclude the role of any types of nuclear weapons in their security strategies and those of their allies;

(e) To reduce immediately the operational status of nuclear weapons, including through complete detargeting and de-alerting;

(f) To reduce substantively all types of nuclear weapons, pending their total elimination;

(g) To apply the principles of irreversibility, transparency and verifiability in nuclear disarmament;

(h) To provide effective, unconditional, non-discriminatory, irrevocable and legally binding security assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances;

(i) Not to conduct any nuclear-weapon test explosions and to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty to facilitate its early entry into force;

(j) To bring into effect, immediately and unconditionally, the security assurances provided by the nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties.

The Movement of Non-Aligned Countries calls upon the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to fully implement the resolutions and decisions adopted at the Review Conferences of the Parties to the Treaty.

The Movement of Non-Aligned Countries reaffirms the long-standing strong global support for the speedy establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East as a matter of priority and, pending its establishment, demands that Israel renounce possession of nuclear weapons and accede, without any precondition and further delay, as a non-nuclear-weapon State to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

The Movement of Non-Aligned Countries calls for practical steps to the convening of the conference on the establishment of a zone free of nuclear and all other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, without any further delay.

The Movement of Non-Aligned Countries urges the Conference on Disarmament to agree as soon as possible on a balanced and comprehensive programme of work in order for it to start substantive work.

The Movement of Non-Aligned Countries calls for the full implementation of General Assembly resolution 70/34, entitled "Follow-up to the 2013 high-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament".

The Movement of Non-Aligned Countries calls for the urgent commencement of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament for the early conclusion of a comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons to prohibit their possession, development, production, acquisition, testing, stockpiling, transfer, use or threat of use and to provide for their destruction.

The above principles and recommendations should constitute some of the possible elements of a comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons.

The following are suggested, inter alia, to be included in the text of a comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons:

- Principles and objectives of the convention
- Scope of the convention
- Definitions
- Measures (obligations) towards nuclear disarmament with a time frame
- Verification: system and organ
- Measures to ensure full compliance with its provisions
- Establishment of a periodic review process with regard to the implementation of the convention
- Settlement of disputes
- Final provisions